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Data Gaps in Natural Resource Management:
Sniffing for Leaks Along the Information Pipeline
HOLLY DOREMUS
Despite wide recognition that natural resource management decisions are heavily
dependent on the supply ofscientific information, little attention has been paid to the
processes by which that information is supplied. This paper lays out the key steps of
the information supply pipeline, which include exploration, extraction, refining,
blending, distribution, and consumption. Leaks in the pipeline can occur at any of
these steps, interrupting the supply of information to decision makers. Because
information supply is contextual and complex, no universal fix can address all
information shortfalls. Nonetheless, several general recommendations emerge. First,
decision makers must recognize the limits of scientific information, both in terms of the
degree ofprecision and certainty attainable, and in terms of the need for other inputs
into decisions. Second, priorities should be more consciously set, both on the broadest
level across multiple resource demands andfor specific problems. Third, freewheeling,
creative exploratory research needs to be better encouraged. That will require more
than increased funding; the training and cultures of both managers and researchers
also need to be addressed. Fourth, the production of available information must keep
up with theoretical advances. Targetedfunding, incentives for information production,
and institutions with an information production mission are all needed to ensure that
extraction keeps pace. Fifth, collaboration needs to extend across traditional
disciplinary, political, and institutional boundaries. Sixth, once information is
produced, it needs to be archived in locations andformats that make it both accessible
to and usefulforfuture researchers and managers. Focusing on the information supply
pipeline helps move discussion beyond the simplistic dichotomy ofprecaution versus
certainty to the ways we can improve the information base for decisions and the value
of those improvements.
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INTRODUCTION
It is widely recognized that information is a limiting factor for environmental and
natural resource policy. 1 Indeed, pervasive uncertainty in a variety of dimensions is
regularly cited as a defining characteristic of environmental problems. 2 The regulatory
system is, as John Applegate has said, "ravenous" for information. 3 That hunger is
particularly acute in the context of natural resource regulation,4 where it appears to be
increasing on an exponential scale that frustrates managers and observers.
5
1. Professor Daniel Esty has drawn up a taxonomy of information needs, detailing the
many points in the environmental decision-making process at which information is needed.
Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 115, 131-
39 (2004).
2. See, e.g., GEORGE H. STANKEY, ROGER N. CLARK & BERNARD T. BORMANN, ADAPTIVE
MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES: THEORY, CONCEPTS, AND MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS,
USDA FOREST SERVICE, PACIFIC NORTHWEST RESEARCH STATION GEN. TECHNICAL REP. PNW-
GTR-654, at 1 (2005) [hereinafter FOREST SERv., ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT]; ROBERT V.
PERCIVAL, CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, ALAN S. MILLER & JAMES P. LEAPE, ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 6 (2003); Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty as a Basis for
Standing, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1123, 1126-27 (2005); Paul C. Stem, Deliberative Methods for
Understanding Environmental Systems, 55 BIOSCIENCE 976, 977 (2005); RICHARD J. LAZARUS,
THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 16-21 (2004); John S. Applegate, The Taming of the
Precautionary Principle, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 13, 18 (2002); Holly
Doremus, Constitutive Law and Environmental Policy, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 295, 319-21
(2003); Alyson C. Flournoy, Building an Environmental Ethic from the Ground Up, 37 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 53, 65 (2003); Alyson C. Flournoy, Legislating Inaction: Asking the Wrong
Questions in Protective Environmental Decisionmaking, 15 HARV. ENVnL. L. REV. 327, 327 n. 1
(1991) (listing additional sources); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental
Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precusor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J.
257, 270-280 (2001); A. Dan Tarlock, Is There a There There in Environmental Law?, 19 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 213,238-39 (2004).
3. John S. Applegate, The Government Role in Scientific Research: Who Should Bridge
the Data Gap in Chemical Regulation?, in RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLmCS: REGULATION AND
THE DISTORTION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 255, 262 (Wendy Wagner & Rena Steinzor eds.,
2006).
4. For purposes of this Article, I intend the term "natural resource regulation" to cover
management by federal, state, or local officials of government-owned resources as well as
[Vol. 83:407
INFORMATION PIPELINE
Demands come from multiple directions. First, regulators are choosing or being
required to implement information-intensive approaches, such as broad-scale
ecosystem management, temporally flexible adaptive management, or ecosystem
service protection, which promise to improve conservation outcomes. 6 The need to
anticipate and respond to environmental change makes natural resource management
intrinsically more information intensive than pollution control, where the health effects
that are of primary concern are not constantly changing. In addition, natural resource
decisions present opportunities for the incorporation of new information because they
are frequently iterative, with the same or similar choices arising periodically. For
example, although the decision to place a series of dams in the mainstem Columbia
River was made decades ago, decisions about how to operate those dams must be made
every year.
Second, political actors have an understandable tendency to tell regulators to
balance on the knife-edge of accommodating conflicting societal interests in
conservation and exploitation of resources. For example, the Endangered Species Act
("ESA") requires that permits be issued for the taking of listed species incidental to
otherwise lawful activities if that taking will not jeopardize the continued existence of
the species.7 In other words, there is a threshold of harm to the species which cannot
be crossed, but development and resource extraction are to be allowed until that
threshold is reached.8
government regulation of activities on private lands that affect public or quasi-public resources.
Although I do not deal directly here with the management of private lands by conservation-
minded owners, I believe the informational challenges in that context are in many ways similar
to those discussed here.
5. See, e.g., Mark Shaffer, Laura Hood Watchman, William J. Snape III & Ingrid K.
Latchis, Population Viability Analysis and Conservation Policy, in POPULATION VIABILITY
ANALYSIS 123, (Steven R. Beissinger & Dale R. McCullough eds., 2002) ("The demand for
answers is outstripping the supply of information on which to base them."); Richard B.
Norgaard & Paul Baer, Collectively Seeing Complex Systems: The Nature of the Problem, 55
BIOSCIENCE 953, 956 (2005) ("Economic interests now argue for business as usual until
scientists can tell us everything with certainty .... ").
6. See FOREST SERV., ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT, supra note 2, at 1-3; NAT'L OCEANIC AND
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., U.S. DEPr. OF COMMERCE, NEW PRIORITIES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY:
NOAA STRATEGIC PLAN, FY 2005-2010, at 4 (2004), available at
http://www.ppi.noaa.gov/pdfs/Strategic-Plans/NOAAStrategicPlan.pdf; FISH & WILDLIFE
SERv., U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR & NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., NAT'L OCEANIC &
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING AND
INCIDENTAL TAKE PERMIT PROCESSING HANDBOOK 3-24 to 3-25 (1996); Robert L. Fischman &
Vicky J. Meretsky, Endangered Species Information: Access and Control, 41 WASHBURN L.J.
90 (2001); Oliver A. Houck, On the Law ofBiodiversity and Ecosystem Management, 81 MINN.
L. REV. 869 (1997); Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructing a Law of
Ecosystem Management, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 314-16 (1994); Catherine M. Rigg,
Orchestrating Ecosystem Management: Challenges and Lessons from Sequoia National Forest,
15 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 78 (2001); John M. Volkman & Willis E. McConnaha, Through a
Glass, Darkly: Columbia River Salmon, the Endangered Species Act, and Adaptive
Management, 23 ENVTL. L. 1249, 1258-61 (1993).
7. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv) (2000).
8. The Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act sets up a similar dynamic; it
requires that fishery management plans "prevent overfishing while achieving... the optimum
yield from each fishery .... 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1) (2000). The Bush Administration's
20081
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Resource users have grown increasingly vocal in their demands that the government
demonstrate in advance that restrictions on resource use or destruction will be effective
in achieving their stated conservation purpose. 9 Under the rubric of "sound science,"
regulatory skeptics insist that high evidentiary standards are needed to, in the words of
Justice Scalia, "avoid needless economic dislocation produced by agency officials
zealously but unintelligently pursuing their environmental objectives."' 0
A response to the extraordinary information intensity of natural resource
management might be to seek policy approaches that impose lower information
demands. That strategy has enjoyed some success in the pollution control context,
where some of the least tractable scientific issues can be finessed by substituting
technology-based requirements for harm-based targets. " It has only limited application
in the natural resource context, however, because the fundamental problem is often
competition for limited resources. At a given level of irrigation withdrawals from a
river, fish will suffer less harm if diversion structures are screened to exclude them.
But if withdrawals cause the river flow to fall below some minimum level, fish will die
regardless of the technology applied at diversion points.
Another way to reduce information demands is to adopt a precautionary or "coarse-
filter" approach, setting aside resources likely to be necessary for conservation without
requiring a detailed showing of their importance.' 2 In today's political climate, these
roadless rule for the national forests provides a more nuanced example. The Clinton
Administration had issued a rule essentially prohibiting timber harvest or road development in
currently roadless portions of the national forest system, accepting the loss of some extractive
use in order to ensure preservation of the ecological and aesthetic values of roadless areas. The
Bush Administration rejected that approach. It adopted a baseline rule treating roadless areas
like the rest of the system, but allowing states to petition for application of a more protective
test. States applying for roadless area protection are required to describe in detail the lands for
which they seek protection, the basis for protection, and impacts of protection on private
property and reducing fire risks. 36 C.F.R. § 294.14 (2007). Given that the lands in question are
federal lands, requiring that state officials provide detailed information about them sets a high
procedural bar. See Robert L. Glicksman, Traveling in Opposite Directions: Roadless Area
Management Under the Clinton and Bush Administrations, 34 ENvTL. L. 1143 (2004) (detailing
descriptions of the Clinton and Bush Administrations' very different policies regarding roadless
areas).
9. In the Klamath Basin water conflicts, for example, irrigators attacked the decisions that
cut off irrigation deliveries in 2001 on the grounds that the available evidence did not support
regulators' claims that higher river flows and lake levels would benefit endangered and
threatened fish. Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Fish, Farms, and the Clash of Cultures in
the Klamath Basin, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 279, 320-21 (2003).
10. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177 (1997). See also Holly Doremus, Science Plays
Defense: Natural Resource Management in the Bush Administration, 32 EOLOGY L.Q. 249,
261-63 (2005).
11. See, e.g., Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of
Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1267 (1985);
Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale for Technology-
Based Regulation, 1991 DuKE L.J. 729; Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-Based
Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 83, 96.
12. A precautionary approach intentionally transfers the information burden to those
seeking to change the status quo. An example would be a general prohibition on new diversions
from any stream containing an endangered fish unless the applicant could establish that the
diversion would not harm the fish. A coarse filter strategy uses rough approximations or best
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types of strategies are not likely to close the information gap in natural resource
management. The precautionary principle typically provides a justification for
maintaining the status quo until we have enough information to persuade us that risks
to human health or the environment are low enough to be worth taking.' 3 That may
well be a desirable approach for deciding whether new chemicals or products made
possible by novel technologies should be allowed on the market. 14 It is a poor fit,
though, for the many natural resource problems where the status quo already
incorporates a high level of environmental modification and considerable risk to the
resource.15 Precaution may justify the decision not to build the next dam, given
uncertainty about the effects on troubled salmon runs. But appeals to precaution are not
likely to lower the demand for information when the question is whether existing dams
can continue to provide inexpensive power or irrigation water. By the same token,
coarse-filter strategies will be a difficult political sell if society is divided on the
relative values of conservation and extraction. A society that wants to have its cake and
eat it too will not relish the potential for unnecessary conservation measures inherent in
coarse-filter approaches. 16
The bottom line, then, is that natural resource management decisions will inevitably
remain highly information intensive for the foreseeable future. Yet little systematic
work has been done to understand the pathways through which scientific information
makes its way into these decisions. Certainly there has been some important
scholarship related to information needs. Recognizing information as a limiting factor
in environmental decisions, scholars have long focused considerable attention on
strategies for decision making in the face of uncertainty.17 Others have highlighted the
guesses to reduce the information burden needed to justify management steps. The Clinton
Administration's rule prohibiting construction of new roads in roadless areas on national lands
was a coarse-filter strategy. See supra note 8.
13. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
13-15 (2005); Applegate, supra note 3; David A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic Defense of the
Precautionary Principle, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1315 (2003); Robert V. Percival, Who's Afraid of
the Precautionary Principle?, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 21 (2005-06); Cass R. Sunstein,
Irreversible and Catastrophic: Global Warming, Terrorism, and Other Problems, 23 PACE
ENvTL. L. REv. 3 (2005-06); Jonathan B. Wiener, Whose Precaution After All? A Comment on
the Comparison and Evolution of Risk Regulatory Systems, 13 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
(SPECIAL IssuE) 207 (2003).
14. See, e.g., Mary Jane Angelo, Embracing Uncertainty, Complexity, and Change: An
Eco-pragmatic Reinvention of a First-Generation Environmental Law, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 105
(2006); John S. Applegate, The Prometheus Principle: Using the Precautionary Principle to
Harmonize the Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
207 (2001); Rebecca Bratspies, The Illusion of Care: Regulation, Uncertainty, and Genetically
Modified Food Crops, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 297 (2002); Thomas 0. McGarity, MTBE: A
Precautionary Tale, 28 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 281 (2004).
15. But see Richard G. Hildreth, M. Casey Jarman & Maggie Langlas, Roles for a
Precautionary Approach in U.S. Marine Resources Management, NAT. REsOURCES & ENVT.,
Summer 2004, at 64 (supporting a precautionary approach to both new and existing uses of
marine resources).
16. The Bush Administration's quick reversal of the Clinton-era national forest roadless
rule suggests the political difficulties currently facing coarse-filter conservation. See supra
note 8.
17. See, e.g., Carl F. Cranor, Toward Understanding Aspects of the Precautionary
Principle, 29 J. MEDICINE & PHILOSOPHY 259 (2004); Marcia R. Gelpe & A. Dan Tarlock, The
2008]
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importance of incentives for the production and disclosure of policy-relevant
information,18 the role that information disclosure requirements or voluntary programs
can play in the environmental policy portfolio, 19 and the need for (and barriers to)
acquisition and incorporation of new information over time. 20 In addition, there has
been generalized discussion of the need for additional scientific information to support
"second-generation" environmental policy decisions, as well as enthusiasm about the
Uses of Scientific Information in Environmental Decisionmaking, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 371,373
(1974); Douglas A. Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural Transformation, and Comprehensive
Rationality, 31 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 555 (2004); Howard A. Latin, The Feasibility of
Occupational Health Standards: An Essay on Legal Decisionmaking Under Uncertainty, 78
Nw. U. L. REV. 583 (1983); Thomas 0. McGarity, Politics by Other Means: Law, Science, and
Policy in EPA 's Implementation of the Food Quality Protection Act, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 103
(2001); Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulatory Decision Making Under Uncertainty, 20
RES. IN L. & ECON. 71 (2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L.
REv. 841 (2006).
18. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Richard Zeckhauser & Edward Parson, Seeking Truth for
Power: Informational Strategy and Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277 (2004);
James E. Krier & W. David Montgomery, Resource Allocation, Information Cost and the Form
of Government Intervention, 13 NAT. RESOURCES J. 89 (1973); Mary L. Lyndon, Information
Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87 MICH. L. REV.
1795 (1989); Stephen M. Johnson, Junking the "Junk Science " Law: Reforming the Information
Quality Act, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 37,47-52 (2006); Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The
Failure of Environmental Law to Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment,
53 DuKEL.J. 1619 (2004).
19. See, e.g., David W. Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting as Informational
Regulation: A Law and Economics Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 379 (2005); Karkkainen,
supra note 2; Clifford Rechtschaffen, The Warning Game: Evaluating Warnings Under
California's Proposition 65, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 303 (1996); Barton H. Thompson, Jr.,
Conservative Environmental Thought: The Bush Administration and Environmental Policy, 32
ECOLOGY L.Q. 307, 331-35 (2005); Michael P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The
Individual as Regulated Entity in the New Era of Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515,
529-33 (2004).
20. See, e.g., PANEL ON ADAPTIVEMGMT. FOR RES. STEWARDSHIP ET AL., NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT FOR WATER RESOURCES PROJECT PLANNING (2004); KAI N.
LEE, COMPASS AND GYROSCOPE: INTEGRATING SCIENCE AND POLITICS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT
(1993); CARL WALTERS, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF RENEWABLE RESOURCES (Wayne M. Getz
ed., 1986); Adaptive Environmental Assessment and Management (C.S. Holling ed., 1978);
Fred Bosselman, A Dozen Biodiversity Puzzles, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 364, 496-504 (2004);
Donald T. Hornstein, Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative Law, 54 DuKE L.J.
913, 936-49 (2005); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regulatory
Penalty Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REv. 943 (2003); Kai N. Lee &
Jody Lawrence, Adaptive Management: Learning from the Columbia River Basin Fish and
Wildlife Program, 16 ENVTL. L. 431 (1986); J.B. Ruhl, Regulation By Adaptive Management: Is
It Possible?, 7 MINN. J. L. ScI. & TECH. 21 (2005); A. Dan Tarlock, A First Look at a Modern
Legal Regimefor a "Post-Modern" United States Army Corps ofEngineers, 52 U. KAN. L. REv.
1285, 1309-24 (2004); John M. Volkman, How Do You Learn From a River? Managing
Uncertainty in Species Conservation Policy, 74 WASH. L. REv. 719 (1999); Volkman et al.,
supra note 6.
21. Carol M. Rose, Environmental Law Grows Up (More or Less), and What Science Can
Do to Help, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 273, 283-89 (2005) (noting the need for what she calls
better "measurement" to support second-generation environmental policy measures).
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potential for new technologies to dramatically change the legal playing field by making
new scientific information available or decreasing the costs of information acquisition,
distribution, and analysis.
As this body of work stands, however, it ignores a crucial aspect of the information
gap problem: the complex processes by which scientific and technical information is
produced, expressed, transmitted, and ultimately incorporated into decisions. 23 While
we will never have complete information, there may be ways to improve prioritization
of information needs, and to make better use of existing information. Both require a
clearer understanding of the workings of the information supply pipeline.
That pipeline, which ultimately provides the intellectual fuel for resource
management decisions, can be usefully analogized to the process which supplies
petroleum to fuel engines. Major steps include exploration, extraction, refining,
blending, distribution, and finally consumption. Leaks in the pipeline, leading to
information gaps, can occur at any point in the process. There certainly are problems of
limited scientific effort, but there are also problems of limited communication, of
information that is not well-matched to the management problem, and of institutions
not capable of responding to information. "More information" is not always critical, or
even helpful.24 Failure to get useful information to the right people can undermine
decisions just as surely as failure to generate information. The same is true for failure
to make effective use of available information. There is no a priori reason to suppose
that any one type of failure is more frequent than another. 25 Instead of reflexively
calling for increased information production, therefore, we ought to take a broad look
at the information supply chain, sniffing for leaks all along the way.
26
22. See, e.g., Esty, supra note 1, at 155-74; Jamie A. Grodsky, Genetics and Environmental
Law: Redefining Public Health, 93 CAL. L. REV. 171 (2005); Albert C. Lin, Beyond Tort:
Compensating Victims of Environmental Toxic Injury, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1439 (2005). But see
David E. Adelman, The False Promise of the Genomics Revolution for Environmental Law, 29
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 117 (2005) (arguing that toxicogenomics is not likely to produce new
information capable of radically reshaping the legal landscape).
23. In the legal literature, Professor Esty has come closest to recognizing the multi-stage
nature of the information supply pipeline, acknowledging at least that the existence of
information does not guarantee its availability to decision makers. Esty, supra note 1, at 207.
Yet he only discusses the possibility that interested parties may withhold information. As
discussed below, there are many other reasons why existing relevant information may be left out
of the decision-making process. The social science literature is more attuned to the complexity
of the problem, but has tended to address various aspects of it in isolation. I have not found a
single source that broadly describes the information supply process and the many ways it can go
awry.
24. Indeed, too much information can be as much a problem for decision makers as too
little. Lee Clarke & James F. Short, Jr., Social Organization and Risk: Some Current
Controversies, 19 ANN. REV. OF Soc. 375, 380 (1993).
25. See David W. Cash, William C. Clark, Frank Alcock, Nancy M. Dickson, Noelle
Eckley, David H. Guston, Jill Jhiger & Ronald B. Mitchell, Knowledge Systems for Sustainable
Development, 100 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF SC. 8086, 8090 (2003) (calling for
greater attention to the "demand side" of the information problem).
26. Leaks in hydrocarbon pipelines are traditionally detected by "sniffing" for escaping
vapors. The technique is still in use, especially for buried or otherwise inaccessible pipelines,
using machines and dogs rather than human noses. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, PUBLIC
2008]
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This Article lays the groundwork for a more sophisticated understanding of the
scientific 27 information gap problem in natural resource management. After setting out
the oil pipeline analogy, it details the elements of the information supply pipeline,
providing examples of leaks at each step. Drawing on that foundation, it then offers
some concrete recommendations for repair and preventive maintenance in order to
maximize the efficiency with which information travels through the line. My examples
are drawn primarily from natural resource management, where the information
problem is particularly acute. The conclusions are equally relevant, however, to
pollution control, drug approval, or any other context in which policy decisions require
scientific input.
I. THE SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION SUPPLY PIPELINE
Scientific information is an input to regulatory decisions, just as petroleum is an
input to transportation. Although the retail gas consumer is likely to be blissfully
unaware of them, a number of steps are necessary prerequisites to the use of fuel to
power an automobile. The same is true for use of information in natural resource
regulation. In fact, the major steps correspond surprisingly well.28
A. A Useful Analogy: Fuel Supply from Crude Oil to Gasoline
For the car (assuming it's a conventional internal combustion model), the process of
getting power to the wheels begins with oil exploration, which reveals the location of
petroleum deposits. Next, the oil is extracted from the ground and transported via
pipeline or tanker to a refinery. There, refining separates the crude oil into
hydrocarbons of different chain lengths and breaks the longest chains into more
valuable small molecules. The result is a series of hydrocarbon fractions corresponding
to industrial solvents, gasoline, diesel fuel, heating oil, and lubricating oils. Chemical
treatment of the fractions removes impurities. The gasoline fractions are then blended
to create different grades of gasoline and mixed with additives to improve combustion
WORKS TECHNICAL BULL. No. 420-49-36, LEAK PROTECTION, at Appendix A (2001), available
at
http://www.wbdg.org/ccb/ARMYCOE/PWTB/pwtb_420_49_36.pdf; W. KENT MUHLBAUER,
PIPELINE RISK MANAGEMENT MANUAL 7/160-7/161 (3d ed., 2004).
27. In this Article, I concentrate on scientific or technical information, by which I mean
information, whether gathered by observation, experiment, or modeling, about the physical and
biological world, because the scientific foundation for regulation has most frequently been the
source of controversy. Other sorts of information, such as information about costs or about
human behavior, can also be limiting for regulatory decisions. See, e.g., Esty, supra note 1, at
139 (displaying a chart of information needs for environmental decisions). Production and use
of socioeconomic and behavioral information are plagued by many of the same difficulties that
apply to the scientific information pipeline. See, e.g., J. Elizabeth Jackson, Robert G. Lee &
Paul Sommers, Monitoring the Community Impacts of the Northwest Forest Plan: An
Alternative to Social Indicators, 17 Soc'Y & NAT. RESOURCES 223 (2004) (noting, among other
problems, limited data availability for socioeconomic evaluation of resource policy, and
aggregation of that data at levels not appropriate to desired evaluation).
28. I am not claiming, of course, that the analogy is perfect, or that the consumption of
information and oil are in all respects similar. Focusing simply on the number and type of steps
necessary to go from raw material to use, though, I find a surprising and educational similarity.
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INFORMATION PIPELINE
and decrease emissions. 29 The fuel is distributed to gas stations by pipeline and truck,
in some cases with additional blending of additives at the delivery stage. Finally, it is
pumped by consumers into their vehicles.
30
Bottlenecks can occur at any step in the process and for any number of reasons.
Exploration may initially be limited by lack of knowledge about the system. At the
dawn of the oil age, exploration consisted of drilling either randomly or near places
where oil seeped to the surface. 31 Gradually, as geologists learned more about the
occurrence of oil below the surface, and just as importantly, accumulated sufficient
successes to persuade oilmen of the usefulness of that knowledge, scientists and
scientific tools came to play a more important role in exploration. 32 Today, satellite
photography, seismography, chemical studies, and computer imaging can be used in
combination to assess the likelihood that oil-bearing rocks lie underlie the surface.
These methods are expensive, though, and especially so in remote locations or
offshore. As a result, they are generally employed only in areas already thought to be
geologically (and presumably economically) promising. 33 Moreover, even with these
new technologies, the science of oil exploration remains highly inexact. The only way
to be sure where oil lies is to drill for it. 34 Even with modem knowledge and
technology, only about one in five test wells proves productive, even in less than
commercial quantities. 35 Uncertainty extends beyond the presence or absence of oil to
its quantity, as the range of estimates of recoverable oil underlying the Arctic National
Wildlife Refuge attests.36
29. Additives have been used for many years to improve engine performance. Today, clean
air regulations also require season- and location-specific additives. As of 2004, twelve different
versions of "summer gas" were in use in different locations in the United States. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MOTOR FUELS: UNDERSTANDING THE FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE THE
RETAIL PRICE OF GASOLINE, GAO-05-525SP, at 38-41 (2005) [hereinafter GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.itemsldO5525sp.pdf.
30. See generally ROBERT 0. ANDERSON, FUNDAMENTALS OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
(1984); GOV'T ACCOUNTABILrrY OFFICE, supra note 29, at 1-2; Chevron, What Is a Refinery?,
http://www.chevron.com/products/learning-center/refinery/; ENERGY INFORMATION
ADMINISTRATION, WHERE DOES MY GASOLINE COME FROM? (2006),
http:l/www.eia.doe.gov/neiclbrochurelgasO6/gasolineO6.pdf; U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR,
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, OSHA TECHNICAL MANUAL, § IV, CHAP.
2 (1999), http:l/www.osha.gov/dts/ostalotmlotm-iv/otm-iv2.html.
31. See ANDERSON, supra note 30, at 94; ROBERT D. LANGENKAMP, OIL BUSINESS
FUNDAMENTALS: EXPLORATION, LEASING, DRILLING, PRODUCTION, MARKETING 11 (1982). For
thousands of years, people had put oil, tar, and asphalt that seeped to the earth's surface to a
variety of uses, but the industrial era exponentially increased both the demand for petroleum
products and the ability to extract them from the earth. See ANDERSON, supra note 30, at 2-11;
ROBERT SOLLEN, AN OCEAN OF OIL: A CENTURY OF POLICAL STRUGGLE OVER PETROLEUM OFF
THE CALIFORNIA COAST 5-8 (1998).
32. See ANDERSON, supra note 30, at 94-96; Langenkamp, supra note 31, at 11-12.
33. ANDERSON, supra note 30, at 100.
34. Id. at 101; Langenkamp, supra note 31, at 15.
35. ANDERSON, supra note 30, at 96.
36. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that the coastal plain of the Arctic National
Wildlife Refuge contains somewhere between 4.2 billion and 11.8 billion barrels of technically
recoverable oil. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, THE OIL AND GAS RESOURCE POTENTIAL OF THE
ARCTIC NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE 1002 AREA, ALASKA, OPEN FILE REPORT 98-34, at 10
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Once a promising site is located, the ability to extract oil is heavily dependent upon
costs and the availability of technologies both for reaching deposits and for using them.
It was not until after World War II that offshore operations became feasible with the
development of, among other things, submersible drilling equipment and platforms
capable of withstanding hurricanes. 37 Even now, offshore operations remain confined
to relatively shallow waters, despite the fact that a high proportion of oil-bearing rocks
are thought to lie at great depths. 38 Offshore operations are highly vulnerable to
interruption by severe weather conditions. In 2005, hurricanes Katrina and Rita
destroyed more than 100 offshore facilities and damaged more than 50 others. By June
2006, oil production in the Gulf of Mexico remained twenty-one percent lower than
pre-storm levels. 39 Onshore, oil sands, oil shale, and extra-heavy oil deposits are not
yet heavily exploited because they are expensive to extract and require additional
processing prior to use.40
Because crude oil has only limited uses, there is little point in extracting it unless it
can be moved to a refinery for processing. Typically, that distribution is done by tanker
ships, pipelines, or a combination of the two. Distribution requires capital-intensive
physical and social infrastructure, including supertankers or large-diameter pipes
extending long distances, ports capable of handling supertankers, and people with the
specialized skills to operate ships and pipelines. Both ships and pipelines are
vulnerable to the weather1 and to ordinary wear and tear,42 and pipelines are targets
for vandalism. 43 Distribution problems can force the shut-down of production
(1988), http://energy.cr.usgs.gov/OF98-34/ANWR1O02.pdf. Another estimate places the
maximum recoverable oil as low as 2.3 billion barrels. Francisco Rocha-Legoretta & Ian
Lerche, Oil and Gas Estimates for Arctic National Wildlife Refuge Area 1002, Alaska, 22
ENERGY EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION 161 (2004).
37. See ROBERT GRAMLING, OIL ON THE EDGE: OFFSHORE DEVELOPMENT, CONFLICT,
GRIDLOCK 37-55 (1996).
38. See ANDERSON, supra note 30, at 148.
39. Kris Axtman, Can Oil Companies Handle More Storms?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
June 6, 2006, at 3. Because most offshore facilities in the Gulf shut down operations in
anticipation of the storms, the initial impact was much higher, shutting down more than one
quarter of U.S. domestic crude oil production. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. OFENERGY, A
PRIMER ON GASOLINE PRICES (2006), http://www.eia.doe.govlbookshelf/brochures/
gasolinepricesprimer/printerversion.pdf.
40. David L. Greene, Janet L. Hopson & Jia Li, Have We Run Out of Oil Yet? Oil Peaking
Analysis from an Optimist's Perpsective, 34 ENERGY POL'Y 515, 516-18 (2006).
41. The 2005 Gulf of Mexico hurricanes did considerable damage to underwater pipelines
that carry oil from off-shore rigs to on-shore refineries. See Tom Fowler, Despite the Havoc
Caused by Recent Hurricanes, Oil Companies Continue to Work on Fields in the Gulf,
HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 8, 2005, at Al.
42. Corrosion produced a pinprick-sized hole in a pipeline leading to the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline in the spring of 2006. Some 267,000 gallons of oil spilled from the leak over the course
of several days before it was discovered. Felicity Barringer, Large Oil Spill in Alaska Went
Undetectedfor Days, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2006, at A18.
43. In 2001, a drunken, down-on-his-luck Alaskan shot a hole in the pipeline with a rifle,
causing a 286,000-gallon spill that cost $20 million to clean up. Ben Spiess, He Never Had a
Chance, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 14, 2001, at Al; Pipeline Cleanup Near End,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Apr. 7, 2002, at B 1.
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facilities. 44 Like the pipelines or ships feeding them, refineries can fall victim to
weather-related problems, as can distribution to retail outlets.45
Even if fuel makes it all the way through the process to a local gas station, it must
still be compatible with the car pulling up to the pump. That is not always a given.
When the catalytic converter was developed in the 1970s to decrease emission of
unburned hydrocarbons, lead additives were still common in gasoline. Lead destroys
catalytic converters. In the short run, before the government mandated for health
reasons that lead additives be phased out of gasoline, 4 6 owners of cars with catalytic
converters had to search out stations with unleaded fuels. To prevent accidental use of
the wrong fuel, the filler ports of cars with catalytic converters were required to be
made sufficiently narrow so that they would not accept the wider nozzles used to
deliver leaded fuels.47
In summary, as important as exploration for oil is, that alone will not make cars run.
All of the elements of the supply pipeline need to work in concert for the ultimate goal
of transportation to be achieved. Pumping more oil out of the ground will not get cars
moving if there is a shortage of refineries or gas stations. Shortfalls in the fuel supply
call for a look at the entire supply chain. The same is true for information shortfalls.
B. The Information Supply Pipeline: From Data to Decisions
Each of the steps in the oil supply chain has a counterpart in the information supply
chain. Indeed, information supply is even more complex, because new information
nearly always raises new questions, so that information production should be recursive.
As a first approximation though, the oil supply chain analogy works reasonably well,
drawing attention to the multitude of steps required for information supply. As with the
oil industry, each step in the information supply chain is potentially vulnerable to
problems. Furthermore, at any one step many different problems can occur.
Diagnosing precisely where problems originate and what causes them can be difficult,
but is an essential prelude to effective repairs.
1. Exploration
Scientific information prospecting requires noticing unanswered questions relevant
to natural resource management, identifying techniques for answering those questions,
44. See Clifford Krauss & Jeremy W. Peters, Biggest Oil Field in U.S. is Forced to Stop
Pumping, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 8, 2006, at Al (noting that corrosion in a pipeline serving Prudhoe
Bay oil field forced BP to temporarily halt production).
45. Shutdowns of both contributed to gasoline shortages in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.
See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 39.
46. See Frank Ackerman, Lisa Heinzerling, & Rachel Massey, Applying Cost-Benefit to
Past Decisions: Was Environmental Protection Ever a Good Idea?, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 155,
160-72 (2005) (discussing the rise and fall of leaded gasoline); C. Boyden Gray & Andrew R.
Varcoe, Octane, Clean Air, and Renewable Fuels: A Modest Step Toward Energy
Independence, 10 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 9, 15-26 (2005); Thomas 0. McGarity, MTBE: A
Precautionary Tale, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 294-96 (2004).
47. See Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives, 38 Fed. Reg. 1254, 1256 (Jan. 10, 1973)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80).
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and finding locations or systems where those techniques might be put to good use.
Risky, expensive, and uncertain as modem oil exploration is, searching for the
scientific information needed to support natural resource management decisions is
even more challenging. The geology of oil deposits is relatively well known at this
point, so that at least prospectors have a good sense of what they hope to find. That
may not be the case for scientific prospectors who deal with extraordinarily complex
systems and often do not know in advance what parameters will be of management
interest. For many, perhaps most, resource management decisions, we are still at the
stage of not knowing what we do not know, and not knowing what techniques, or even
what fields of study, are most likely to produce useful information.48
The limited funding available for environmental research is certainly one
impediment to effective exploration. Federal support of management-relevant
environmental research in government labs and in universities seems quite low by
comparison to other fields, particularly medical research. According to the National
Science Foundation ("NSF'), in fiscal year 2003 the federal government spent a total
of $3.7 billion to support research in "environmental sciences," a category that
generally represents the study of the physical environment but also includes
oceanography.4 9 Another $717 million went to support research in "environmental
biology," which includes ecology, evolutionary biology, population biology, and the
like; just over $200 million of that was in the form of grants for university-based
research.5 0 By comparison, spending on the nonenvironmental biological sciences,
which encompass medical and sub-organismal fields, was $18.6 billion. 51
It is difficult to interpret these numbers for several reasons. The costs of different
types of research can vary widely, and their societal benefits are difficult to compare.
Moreover, the reported numbers likely both under- and over-report research with
natural resource management significance. The reporting category of "environmental
biology" excludes work in fields like anatomy or physiology, which might end up
being highly relevant to resource management, while "environmental science" includes
48. As a prominent group of conservation scientists and practitioners has said, "sustaining
species and ecosystems will require conserving at least some minimum amount-whether it is a
number of individuals, a number of populations, or an area. The harsh reality is that for the vast
majority of species, communities, or ecosystems, these minima are unknown. Lack of critical
information on species and ecosystem distributions constrains conservation biologists' ability to
test the underlying assumptions of conservation objective setting." Timothy H. Tear, Peter
Kareiva, Paul L. Angermeier, Patrick Comer, Brian Czech, Randy Kautz, Laura Landon, David
Mehlman, Karen Murphy, Mary Ruckelshaus, J. Michael Scott & George Wilhere, How Much
Is Enough? The Recurrent Problem of Setting Measurable Objectives in Conservation,
BIOSCIENCE, Oct. 2005, at 847. One could add that lack of knowledge about the basic biology
and life cycles of species is at least as much of a problem as lack of knowledge about their
distribution.
49. Div. OF Sci. RES. STUDIES, NAT'L Sci. FOUND., FEDERAL FUNDS FOR RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT: FIscAL YEARS 2003-05, NSF 06-313, at 59 (2006),
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsf06313/nsf06313.pdf. The totals include grants for research at
universities as well as direct government spending. For both environmental science and
environmental biology, spending was roughly evenly divided between basic and applied
research, as defined by NSF.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 146.
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a considerable amount of NASA-funded research that may not be very relevant to
natural resource conflicts. In addition, funding for environmental science and
environmental biology research has risen at a faster rate than overall federal research
spending over the past twenty years. 52 With all those caveats, however, the low level
of funding for ecology, population biology, and conservation biology-the biological
fields likely to be most directly connected to resource management decisions-is
striking. I am by no means the first to make this observation. EPA's Science Advisory
Board has expressed dismay at the low level of that agency's commitment to
ecological research. The Board has pointed out that not only does EPA's science
budget continue to decline in real-dollar terms, but it also shows "a systematic bias
against ecosystem research" 53and more generally against the kind of core basic
research that can help identify and frame an early response to new challenges.54
Beyond the low levels of general support for exploratory science on natural
systems, directed research efforts in support of specific management initiatives can fall
victim to funding shortfalls. The 1994 Northwest Forest Plan included a commitment
to experimental and adaptive management in ten specified areas, which are referred to
as Adaptive Management Areas ("AMAs"). "Despite good intentions, the goal of
devising and studying alternative management strategies essentially fizzled. ' 55 One
reason was budgetary. When the plan was first implemented, the Forest Service
provided funding to support adaptive management work. Within a few years, however,
"much of this support disappeared,, 56 including funding for the lead scientists initially
assigned to each AMA.57
Lack of funding, though, is only one barrier to exploration. Even if money is
available, some questions can be very difficult to ask because of the inability to
conduct controlled studies. As an example, despite years of intensive study, there is
still little agreement about the relative importance of the impact of harvest, hatchery,
logging, and dam operations on salmon in the Columbia River system because of the
difficulty of isolating the effects of individual factors from each other and from
changing ocean conditions.58
52. See id. at 299, 301.
53. U.S. EPA SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, SCIENCE AND RESEARCH BuDGETs FOR THE U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007, AN ADVISORY REPORT BY THE
SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, EPA-SAB-ADV-06-003, at 2 (2006),
http://www.epa.gov/sciencel/pdflsab-adv-06-003.pdf. The Board noted that funding for
ecological research declined by $30 million from FY 2004 to 2007, contrary to "the prevailing
position that such research is critical for the Agency to better manage and track the benefits" of
its environmental management activities. Id. at 11.
54. See id. at A-5; U.S. EPA SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, SCIENCE AND RESEARCH BUDGETS
FOR THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006, AN ADVISORY
REPORT BY THE EPA SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, EPA-SAB-ADV-05-002, at 4-5 (2005),
http://www.epa.gov/sciencel/pdf/science and -res_.budgets-fy-2006_sab-adv-05-002.pdf.
55. Eric Stokstad, Learning to Adapt, ScI., July 29,2005, at 688.
56. George H. Stankey, Roger N. Clark & Bernard T. Bormann, Adaptive Management and
the Northwest Forest Plan: Rhetoric and Reality, J. FORESTRY, Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 40, 43.
57. See id. at 44; Stokstad, supra note 55, at 690 ("When national forest budgets got tight,
these experiments were axed or fell lower on priority lists.").
58. See COMM. ON PROT. & MGMT. OF PAC. Nw. ANADROMOUS SALMONIDs, NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, UPSTREAM: SALMON AND SOCIETY IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 39-74
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Exploratory work that is both feasible and relevant can also be delayed or prevented
by subtle social, institutional, or legal barriers. Ironically, agencies' commitment to
protecting the resources under their charge can be one of the most impenetrable
barriers. It can make managers reluctant to conduct, or regulators reluctant to permit,
controlled trials of management strategies assumed to be helpful. As Professor Donald
Hornstein explains,
in determining the value of experimentation..., values will be discounted by the
foregone benefits of applying the agency's existing regulations .... Especially
when such values are high, for example when a species might become extinct or
public health could worsen because of these foregone benefits, this discount rate
will be high and the agency will perennially reach a rational cost-benefit
calculation that it is not worth experimenting. 9
Management of the Columbia River hydropower system illustrates the impacts of
such implicit discounting. The Army Corps of Engineers transports juvenile salmon by
barge around the mainstem Columbia River dams, keeping the fish out of the turbines
without requiring the dams to spill water. In 1993, John Volkman and Willis
McConnaha noted that managers recognized the paucity of data showing that barging
increased survival, but were unwilling to run controlled tests because failing to
transport a control group could, if barging was in fact helpful, pose unacceptable
risks. 60 Nearly fifteen years later, studies of mortality in barged versus in-river smolts
are just beginning to appear in the peer-reviewed literature. 61 It is still not known why
barging does not increase survival to the extent that would be predicted on the basis of
avoiding passage through the dams. Similarly, a study of implementation of the
adaptive management provisions of the Northwest Forest Plan found that
experimentation was inhibited by reflexive regulatory opposition to actions thought to
pose a risk to endangered species. 62 Managerial risk aversion is likely to be
accentuated where management efforts are controversial and advocacy groups distrust
each other and resource managers.
63
(1996) (detailing the effects of changing ocean conditions and a variety of human activities on
salmon).
59. Donald T. Hornstein, Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative Law, 54
DuKE L.J. 913, 947-48 (2005).
60. Volkman & McConnaha, supra note 6, at 1260.
61. See, e.g., Carl B. Schreck, Thomas P. Stahl, Lawrence E. Davis, Daniel D. Roby &
Benjamin J. Clemens, Mortality Estimates of Juvenile Spring-Summer Chinook Salmon in the
Lower Columbia River and Estuary 1992-1998: Evidence for Delayed Mortality?, 135
TRANSACriONS OF THE AM. FISHERIES Soc. 457 (2006); Tyler Wagner, James L. Congleton &
Douglas M. Marsh, Smolt-to-Adult Return Rates of Juvenile Chinook Salmon Transported
Through the Snake-Columbia River Hydropower System, USA, in Relation to Densities of Co-
Transported Juvenile Steelhead, 68 FisErins REs. 259 (2004).
62. See Stankey et al., supra note 56, at 43. These researchers found that although
managers typically attributed these inhibitions to inflexible laws, the real situation was more
complex. The law allowed more flexibility than either managers or regulators appeared to
understand or be willing to explore.
63. See Stokstad, supra note 55, at 690 (noting that environmental groups fought what they
saw as efforts to use AMAs "primarily to extract timber rather than to improve the
ecosystems"); Douglas A. Kysar & James Salzman, Environmental Tribalism, 87 MINN. L. REv.
1099 (2003) (discussing the tendency of opposing interests in resource disputes to demonize one
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The more high profile the problem, the more likely managers are to want to take
some action in response, lest they be perceived as simply waiting for an endless series
of studies. All too often, the result is that management actions, even those that arouse
substantial opposition, may continue for decades without any evaluation of their
effectiveness. Consider badger culling in Great Britain. Although it is still a relatively
minor economic problem, bovine tuberculosis has proven difficult to control in Great
Britain. Wild badgers provide a reservoir of tuberculosis (TB), and it is widely thought
that they can transmit the disease to cattle.64 Destruction of badgers as a bovine TB
control strategy began soon after they were first linked to the disease in 1973. Farmers
and the government tried several different badger-culling strategies. Because
environmentalists and animal welfare activists objected to any culling, by 1985 the
predominant strategy was one of selective culling only in response to detection of TB
in cattle. Until 1998, no attempt was made to rigorously evaluate the effectiveness of
culling or to compare culling methods. 65 Finally the government agreed to undertake a
multi-year controlled trial, at a cost of $30 million. 66 Initial results were mixed and
confusing. Looking at just the treated areas, there seemed to be a decrease in bovine
TB with widespread proactive culling, but an increase over the controls with small-
scale reactive culling in response to cattle infections. Looking beyond the treated areas
though, provided an explanation. Ecological research had suggested that culling
disrupts the social behavior of badgers, causing survivors to range more widely and
perhaps putting them in contact with more cattle herds. Putting two and two together,
scientists evaluated bovine TB incidence just outside the areas culled and found a
significant increase. 67 The controlled experiments were costly, but if heeded could
have great value. They suggest that the reactive culling strategy on which managers
had settled in their effort to accommodate all political stakeholders was probably the
worst approach to the biological problem.
In addition to showing the value of actually testing the assumptions that underlie
management choices, the badger case study shows the importance of involving
creative, "academic-style" scientists who will continuously refine experiments. Had
the badger researchers clung single-mindedly to the original protocol, which called
only for collecting data from treated areas and matched controls, they would not have
discovered the increased TB incidence in areas just outside the culling zones.
Academics are certainly not the only people who can or do think creatively about
scientific problems. But it should not come as a surprise that in the badger case the
researchers who did that kind of thinking were in fact academics serving on an
independent advisory group to the government. 68 The career paths leading to academic
another).
64. See, e.g., Christl A. Donnelly, Rosie Woodroofe, D.R. Cox, F. John Bourne, George
Gettinby, Andrea M. Le Fevre, John P. Mclnerney & W. Ivan Morrison, Impact of Localized
Badger Culling on Tuberculosis Incidence in British Cattle, 426 NATURE 834 (2003); Ehsan
Masood, Outcry as 'Scientific'Badger Cull is Launched to Target TB, 394 NATURE 821 (1998).
65. See Donnelly et al., supra note 64, at 834.
66. See Masood, supra note 64, at 821.
67. See Christi A. Donnelly, Rosie Woodroofe, D.R. Cox, F. John Bourne, C.L.
Cheeseman, Richard S. Clifton-Hadley, Gao Wei, George Gettinby, Peter Gilks, Helen Jenkins,
W. Thomas Johnston, Andrea M. Le Fevre, John P. Mcnerney, & W. Ivan Morrison, Positive
and Negative Effects of Widespread Badger Culling on Tuberculosis in Cattle, 439 NATURE 843
(2006).
68. See Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Bovine TB: The Independent
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science tend to select those with an inclination toward and flair for broadly creative
problem solving. Moreover, at least in theory, academics, unlike agency personnel,
have the luxury of time and implicit institutional permission to pursue their wildest
ideas.69 The late physicist Richard Feynman told the story of how his research career
took off once he allowed himself to play with physics, puzzling out how a plate tossed
in the air wobbled because that seemed interesting, rather than worrying about the need
to do important work.70 Many modem academics might say that they experience the
pressures to publish and get grants more strongly than comes through in Feynman's
portrayal, 7' but they nonetheless retain the autonomy in their working lives to pursue
the obsessive curiosity that commonly motivates them. Academics are not likely to be
interested in the minute details of specific management decisions, but they have the
skills and opportunity to reduce the big gaps in understanding ecological systems that
most plague those decisions.
72
Unfortunately, it is not always easy to involve academic scientists deeply in the
types of studies most needed to support natural resource management. The reward of
academic prestige is still closely tied to publications in prestigious journals, which tend
to be most interested in highly theoretical "pure" science studies. Furthermore,
although academics are strongly buffered against adverse employment effects once
they get tenure, before that they are advised to be cautious by following the generally
accepted path in their discipline. Pursuing problem-oriented interdisciplinary studies is
risky, because it is unlikely to produce as many prestigious publications as work in a
single discipline. It may also pose problems when it comes time for tenure review,
because reviewers from typical disciplinary backgrounds may not know how to
evaluate cross-disciplinary work.7"
Scientific Group on Cattle TB, http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/tb/isg/ (describing the
Independent Scientific Group's charge and membership).
69. See Poul Degnbol, Henrik Gislason, Susan Hanna, Svein Jentoft, Jesper Raakjer
Nielsen, Sten Sverdrup-Jensen, Douglas Clyde Wilson, Painting the Floor with a Hammer:
Technical Fixes in Fisheries Management, 30 MARINE POL' y 534, 538 (2006) (noting that "the
workload of routine management does not allow time for strategic thinking or the luxury of
exploring new solutions and tools").
70. See RICHARD P. FEYNMAN AS TOLD TO RALPH LEIGHTON, SURELY YOU'RE JOKING, MR.
FEYNMAN! ADVENTURES OF A CURIOUS CHARACTER. 143-74 (Edward Hutchings ed., Bantam
Books trade ed. 1989) (1985).
71. These days it is hard to imagine a senior colleague telling a recent hire not to worry
about whether he or she is meeting expectations beyond the classroom, as Feynman reports he
was told. Id. at 173.
72. In the words of an experienced scientist-manager: "[O]ur best hope in preserving [the
biota] lies in a better understanding of the biology of the organisms themselves, and this
information is best derived through the university research community." Edwin P. Pister,
Professional Obligations in the Conservation of Fishes, 55 ENvTL. BIOLOGY OF FISHES 13, 17
(1999) (alteration to original).
73. See, e.g., Lisa M. Campbell, Overcoming Obstacles to Interdisciplinary Research, 19
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 574, 574-75 (2005); Norgaard & Baer, supra note 5, at 957-58;
Andrew Sobel, Comments on Globalization, Interdisciplinary Research, Myopia and
Parochialism, Government, Convergence, and Culture, 9 J. INT'L MGMT. 419,420 (2003). It is
easy to imagine a very different set of academic incentives where tenure candidates are judged,
for example, on the contribution their research makes to solving societal problems. See Pister,
supra note 72, at 17. Nevertheless, the academic system is remarkably resistant to attempts to
implement that kind of change.
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Even after tenure, barriers remain. Young academics who pretend to fit the
traditional mold of their discipline may find once they gain the freedom of tenure that
"the mask has stuck to their face," 74 and they no longer want to do anything else. Of
course, many academic scientists are strongly committed to conservation of the
resources they study, and want to contribute to that cause. But they are busy people,
with many professional demands on their time. Participation in scientific advisory
groups, review committees and the like, especially if it does not produce publications
or grants, has to be added on top of other professional demands. It can be a frustrating
hobby, particularly if decision makers do not take the advice offered. On the other side,
agency personnel, who may not be accustomed to the world of peer review, do not
always appreciate the involvement of outside critics. To top it all off, scientists who
jump into the policy realm are likely to find themselves in the middle of nasty
conflicts, and even the target of personal attacks or attacks on their professional
conduct. 75 Even strong motivation to do meaningful work can evaporate in the face of
such strong countervailing pressures.
2. Extraction
i. The difference between exploration and extraction
Extraction of scientific information is the collection of data by observation,
experiment, or modeling once a promising lead has been developed. The distinction
between exploration and extraction can be fuzzy, just as it is in the oil industry, where
exploratory wells are drilled to see if commercial-scale extraction is feasible. Scientific
exploration produces data, and data production frequently involves some creative
exploratory steps as well. Scientists may keep adjusting their data collection protocols,
and the questions they are asking, well into a study as they refine their understanding
of the system.
While the boundary is surely fuzzy, distinguishing exploration from extraction
highlights an important difference between two types of data collection. One is
academic-style science, driven by the search for improved conceptual understanding of
a system and motivated by insatiable curiosity. It implies self-conscious comparison of
the data with existing understanding of how a system works. The point of exploration
is to challenge, refine, and extend that understanding. Exploration need not take place
in academia, but it requires a mind-set that is far more common in universities than in
regulatory agencies.76 Explorers must be open to new approaches, not bound by
standardized rules or prescriptions. They must be free to follow their ideas, without too
74. My colleague Joel Dobris introduced me to this expression.
75. Thomas 0. McGarity, Our Science is Sound Science and Their Science is Junk Science:
Science-Based Strategies for Avoiding Accountability and Responsibility for Risk-Producing
Products and Activities, 52 U. KAN. L. REv. 897, 917-19 (2004); see also Wendy E. Wagner,
Importing Daubert to Administrative Agencies Through the Information Quality Act, 12 J.L. &
POL'V 589, 611 (2004) (noting attacks on researcher whose studies showed harmful effects of
atrazine).
76. A few government agencies, notably in the natural resources context the U.S.
Geological Survey (USGS), also adopt this model. The USGS is not a regulatory agency; it may
therefore become easier to structure it like an academic institution.
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many bureaucratic constraints. Management-style routine data collection is a very
different thing, focused on monitoring the behavior of a system over time or in
response to perturbation in order to achieve or set a management goal rather than
primarily to advance understanding.77 It may produce data that motivate a new way of
looking at the system, but it does not begin with that in mind. The knowledge-driven
quest for improved understanding is properly categorized as part of the "exploration"
step of the pipeline, while the issue-driven collection of information falls in the
"extraction" category.
Extraction is more likely to be carried out by or under the direction of resource
managers, but that is not the key distinction. Extraction provides data that, given
current beliefs about how the system works, lead to management decisions.
Exploration produces data that either confirm or refute current beliefs about the
system. It is permitted, even expected from time to time, to upset the assumptions
underlying management decisions. The marbled murrelet, a small seabird that nests in
the Pacific coastal forest and feeds in ocean waters, provides a concrete example.
Because the marbled murrelet is listed as threatened under the ESA,78 state and federal
officials generally require that landowners within its range survey for the bird, using
established protocols, before they harvest timber. 79 The point of those surveys is not to
determine the needs of the marbled murrelet, but to determine whether a proposed
timber harvest will interfere with those needs, as they are currently understood by the
regulatory authorities. By contrast, a very different type of study has recently called
into question current thinking about threats to the murrelet. Researchers at U.C.
Berkeley studied murrelet diets to see if fishing, not just logging, might be affecting
the bird. Their data suggest that the proportion of low trophic level species, such as
krill, in the murrelets' diet has significantly increased over the past century, while the
proportion of fish from higher up the food chain, such as sardines or anchovies, has
decreased.80 The authors attribute the change in diet to reduced availability of top-level
prey as human beings have "fished down the food web." 81 It seems that murrelets, like
77. The difference between these two different types of studies has been expressed in a
variety of ways. A National Research Council committee has explained that one focuses on
cataloging what is present in a study area, collecting occurrence, distribution data, and
documenting changes over time, while the other focuses on understanding those trends in order
to identify cause-and-effect relationships. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMMITTEE TO
IMPROVE THE U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY NATIONAL WATER QUALITY ASSESSMENT PROGRAM,
OPPORTUNITIES TO IMPROVE THE U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY NATIONAL WATER QUALITY
ASSESSMENT PROGRAM 6 (2002).
78. See 50 C.F.R. 17.11(h) (2005); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants;
Determination of Threatened Status for the Washington, Oregon, and California Population of
the Marbled Murrelet , 57 Fed. Reg. 45,328 (Oct. 1, 1992) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
79. See Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Pilchuk Audubon Soc., 97 F.3d 1161, 1167-70 (9th Cir.
1996) (upholding use of the Pacific Seabird Group protocol); DIANE EVANS MACK ET AL.,
METHODS FOR SURVEYING MARBLED MURRELETS IN FORESTS: A REVISED PROTOCOL OF LAND
MANAGEMENT AND RESEARCH (Pacific Seabird Group Technical Publication Number 2,2003),
http://www.pacificseabirdgroup.org/publications/PSG TechPub2_MAMUISP.pdf.
80. Benjamin H. Becker & Steven R. Beissinger, Centennial Decline in the Trophic Level
of an Endangered Seabird After Fisheries Decline, 20 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 470 (2006).




many people, prefer to eat near the top of the food chain if possible. Prey at lower
trophic levels provide a lower energy return for the effort needed to catch them,
leading the authors to speculate that the overfishing-induced decline of marine
predators may have reduced the murrelets' reproductive success and thereby
contributed to its decline.8 2 This study obviously was not intended to evaluate the
impacts of a specific logging proposal, or even a specific fishing proposal, on the
murrelet. Instead, the authors sought to advance general understanding of the causes of
murrelet decline. An incidental consequence of their study, however, is that (at least if
the study is confirmed and extended) it may lead regulators to look to fishing as well as
logging as activities that must be controlled in order to achieve murrelet recovery.
Exploratory studies are not necessarily divorced from specific management
decisions. Studies that seek to evaluate the assumptions, particularly the hidden or
unrecognized assumptions, of management can provide important new streams of
information. An example comes from attempts to conserve the endangered island fox
(Urocyon littoralis), a species endemic to the Channel Islands off the coast of
California. The fox is threatened in part by predation by golden eagles, which have
arrived on the islands recently, attracted by a population explosion of feral pigs. The
pigs, in addition to feeding eagles, cause problems for native vegetation. Island
managers, therefore, have sought to eradicate them. They have assumed that removing
pigs would also benefit the fox, since the presence of pigs has been a major factor in
the fox's decline.83 They have been more reluctant to pursue golden eagles, especially
by lethal methods, because of the eagles' charisma and the legal complications.84 A
computer modeling study, however, indicated that eradicating pigs without removing
eagles could lead to the rapid extinction of the island fox as eagles turn from preying
on pigs to preying on foxes.
8 5
The bottom line is that exploratory and extractive studies are not fungible. Both are
needed. The two may be most effectively carried out through different institutions, but
the results of both must find their way into regulatory decisions in order for
conservation to be effective.
ii. A partial catalogue of extraction shortfalls
The U.S. government collects and compiles reams of environmental data every
year. 86 A 1997 estimate places total federal funding for the collection of environmental
82. See Becker & Beissinger, supra note 80, at 477.
83. CHANNEL ISLANDS NAT'L PARK, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, SANTA CRUZ ISLAND
PRIMARY RESTORATION PLAN: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 5 (2002),
http://www.nps.gov/chis/parkmgmt/santa-cruz-island-eis.htm.
84. Golden eagles are protected by the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §
668-668d (2000), and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-11 (2000 & Supp.
2005). They may only be killed or captured in accordance with rules established by the
Department of Interior. See 16 U.S.C. § 668(a); 16 U.S.C. § 703.
85. Franck Courchamp, Rosie Woodroffe & Gary Roemer, Removing Protected
Populations to Save Endangered Species, 302 SCIENCE 1532 (2003).
86. For a partial listing of federal environmental data programs, see U.S. GOV'T
ACcOUNTABirrY OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION: STATUS OF FEDERAL DATA PROGRAMS
THAT SUPPORT ECOLOGICAL INDICATORS, GAO-05-376 (2005).
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data at more than $600 million annually.8 7 Nonetheless, data gaps plague natural
resource managers. In the course of preparing a major 2002 report on the state of the
nation's ecosystems, the Heinz Center could find all the data needed to support
national analysis for only 33 of 103 key indicators.
8 8
The reasons for these gaps are not obscure. Extraction is not as risky as exploration,
but it still consumes substantial resources without offering immediate payoffs. Not
surprisingly, it often has more political enemies than friends. Wendy Wagner has
described in detail the challenge of getting private parties to generate or disclose
information in the hazardous materials context.8 9 Similar difficulties apply in the
conservation context, particularly where resource management impacts privately-
owned lands.
90
But there is another side to the natural resource information problem. State and
federal governments would appear to be in a strong position to extract information
relevant to resource management, because they control or at least have the authority to
access large amounts of land, 91 marine waters, navigable fresh waters, and the
atmosphere. Nonetheless, governmental information extraction efforts have frequently
been curtailed, often because of fears that the resulting data would be used to
strengthen regulation.
Perhaps the best known example of this phenomenon is the short, unhappy life of
the National Biological Survey (NBS). In 1993, with the stated goal of improving
scientific support for proactive resource management efforts, Secretary of the Interior
Bruce Babbitt established the NBS on the model of the highly regarded United States
Geological Survey (USGS), consolidating the Department's biological research
functions in a single entity organized on a more academic than bureaucratic model.
92
87. COMM. ON ENV'T & NATURAL RES., EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING AND RESEARCH WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS (Feb. 25, 1997) as cited
in THE H. JOHN HEINZ IlI CENTER FOR SCIENCE, ECONOMICS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT, THE STATE
OF THE NATION' S ECOSYSTEMS: MEASURING THE LANDS, WATERS, AND LIVING RESOURCES OF THE
UNITED STATES 3 (2002) [hereinafter STATE OF THE NATION'S ECOSYSTEMS].
88. Id. at 18. Partial data were available for another twenty-five indicators. Id.
89. See Wagner, supra note 18.
90. See, e.g., PETER KAREIVA Er AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR ECOLOGICAL ANALYSIS AND
SYNTHESIS & THE AMERICAN INST. OF BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES, USING SCIENCE IN HABITAT
CONSERVATION PLANS, 14 (1999) (detailing scientific limitations of habitat conservation plans);
Stephen Polasky & Holly Doremus, When the Truth Hurts: Endangered Species Policy on
Private Land with Incomplete Information, 35 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 22 (1998) (explaining
how the law gives landowners strong control of some information about the resources on their
land, and the lack of incentives to disclose that information to regulators); Matthew E. Rahn,
Holly Doremus, & James Diffendorfer, Species Coverage in Multispecies Habitat Conservation
Plans: Where's the Science?, 56 BIOSCIENCE 613 (2006) (detailing how limited the information
about even the presence or absence of covered species is in approved habitat conservation
plans).
91. The United States owns roughly 30% of the nation's land. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2006, at 22, tbl. 548 (125th ed.),
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2006/tablesO6sO348.xls.
92. See National Biological Survey; Establishment of Organization, 58 Fed. Reg. 63,387
(Dec. 1, 1993); Karen A. Scanna, The National Biological Survey: A Step Along the Path to
Ecosystem Conservation, 4 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 134 (1995); Richard Stone, Babbitt Shakes Up
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The scientific and resource management communities had mixed reactions to the
new agency, with enthusiasm for the integration of fragmented efforts but concern
about loss of ties to the direct needs of managers. The property rights community, and
the Republican majority in Congress, were unified in strong opposition to the Survey,
which they saw as a threat to development of private property. 93 In order to survive at
all, the new unit had to accept a lower profile as a division of the established USGS,
make do with a greatly reduced budget, ramp down its ambitious plans for a
comprehensive survey of the nation's biota, and also deal with the morale problems
inherent in the dislocation of hundreds of scientists from one agency to another with a
very different culture.
94
The NBS debacle defeated efforts to institutionalize a commitment to information
extraction. Even without a dedicated institutional home, information extraction efforts
could in theory be robust. A litany of examples of failure to extract information that is
both readily available and highly relevant to management, however, suggests that the
systemic information gaps that motivated NBS advocates remain. Collection of
baseline information is less than sexy under the best of conditions. When budgets are
tight, and especially when data are politically inconvenient, information extraction
efforts become easy targets. Here are just a few examples:
* The Climate Reference Network established by the National Oceanic &
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in 2001 to provide a high-quality
long-term record of climatic conditions across the United States saw its
funding eliminated by Congress in the fiscal year 2005 budget. At the
same time, funding for a system of observatories whose measurements of
atmospheric CO 2 levels over the past 50 years provided one of the earliest
indications of global warming was deeply slashed. 95 The attack prompted
this reaction from one climate scientist: "It's almost as if some people
don't want to know how the climate is changing .... Maybe they prefer
uncertainty, so that they can avoid taking action." 96
" In 2002, shortly after it issued a major report revealing the extent of
contamination of the nation's waterways with antibiotics, pharmaceuticals,
and a variety of other household chemicals, 97 the USGS's Toxic
Substances Hydrology Program found itself targeted for elimination by the
Bush administration.
98
Science at Interior, 261 SCIENCE 976 (1993).
93. Frederic H. Wagner, Whatever Happened to the National Biological Survey?, 49
BIOSCIENCE 219, 220 (1999); see also Stone, supra note 92, at 976.
94. See Colin Macilwain, US Geological Survey Picks Up the NBS Pieces, 382 NATURE
658, 658 (1996); Wagner, supra note 93; conversation with Samuel N. Luoma, Senior Research
Scientist, USGS (Mar. 25, 2006).
95. Jeffrey Mervis, NOAA Loses Funding to Gather Long-Term Climate Data, 307 SCIENCE
188 (2005).
96. Id. at 188 (quoting Kevin Trenberth of the National Center for Atmospheric Research).
97. Dana W. Kolpin, Edward T. Furlong, Michael T. Meyer, E. Michael Thurman, Steven
D. Zaugg, Larry B. Barber, & Herbert T. Buxton, Pharmaceuticals, Hormones, and Other
Organic Wastewater Contaminants in U.S. Streams, 1999-2000: A National Reconnaissance,
36 ENvTL. SCI. & TECH. 1202 (2002).
98. Greg Fuhs, U.S. Congress Seeks to Maintain USGS Water Science Funds, WATER
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" Although the Clean Water Act directs the states to report every two years
to the EPA on the water quality of all navigable waters within their
boundaries, 99 water quality monitoring covers only a small proportion of
the nation's waters. 100 Surely not every mile of every stream needs to be
directly tested, but the reports provide neither justification for sample
selection nor reason to believe that the data produced provide any
information about the miles not sampled. The problem, it seems, is that the
law assumes that stream segments are not impaired unless data
affirmatively show impairment. 10 1 As a result, information can only
tighten the regulatory noose, and economic interests have every incentive
to oppose its gathering.
" The Fish Passage Center, which provides technical data about salmon
movement downstream through the mainstem Columbia River dams, came
under fire from Idaho Senator Larry Craig after environmental groups used
some of its data in a lawsuit that resulted in a court order to increase the
amount of water spilled over those dams.1 0°2 Craig managed to get a
paragraph placed in the Conference Report for the Fiscal Year 2006
Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act 103 forbidding further
funding of the Fish Passage Center. 104 As directed by the Report, the
Bonneville Power Administration did cut off funding for the Center, but
the Ninth Circuit has ordered support restored pending resolution of a
lawsuit brought by environmental groups. 1
05
ENV'T & TECH., Oct. 1, 2002, at 29-30. Congress refused to go along with the administration's
request to eliminate the program, but its budget has been essentially flat since at least 2000, the
earliest year for which budget data is available by program office at the USGS web site.
99. 33 U.S.C. § 1315(b)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
100. Less than 20% of river miles nationwide were assessed for the 2000 reporting cycle.
EPA, NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY: 2000 REPORT at ES-3 (Aug. 2002),
http://www.epa.gov/305b/2000report/. For the 2002 reporting cycle, EPA has made available
only the raw state reports; no national totals for the proportion of waters assessed (or for the
proportion impaired) have been calculated. California reported in 2000 that it had assessed the
status of less than 12% of its river miles. Id. at 85. By 2002, it had made a small measure of
progress, with assessed river miles up to more than 15%.
http://iaspub.epa.gov/waters/w305b-report-v2.state?p-state--CA#total-assessed-waters.
101. See 40 C.F.R. § 130.20) (2006) (defining "water quality limited segment" as "[any
segment where it is known that water quality does not meet applicable water quality
standards...") (emphasis added).
102. Paul VanDevelder, The Tide May Be Turning for Salmon, L.A. TIME, Feb. 4, 2007,
at 3.
103. Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-103, 119 Stat. 2276 (2005); H.R. REP. No. 109-275, at 174 (2005) ("The Bonneville
Power Administration may make no new obligations in support of the Fish Passage Center.").
104. Peter Sleeth, Groups Challenge Move to Cut Fish Study Funding, OREGONIAN
(Portland), Jan. 24, 2006, at B5; Yudhijit Bhattacharjee ed., Random Samples: People, 310
SCIENCE 1613 1613 (2005).
105. Order, Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Bonneville Power Admin., No. 06-70430 (Mar. 17,
2006), available at http://www.peaclaw.org/objects/FPCOrder.pdf. The lawsuit asserts that the
Northwest Power Act requires continued funding of the Fish Passage Center. Petition for
Review, Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Bonneville Power Admin., No. 06-70430 (Jan. 20, 2006),
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One of the biggest challenges for extraction, given the realities of short-term budget
and political cycles, is the maintenance of long-term data collection efforts. Because of
lack of funding, for example, states and the federal government are ending support for
river gauges which have been collecting data for decades. The continuous long-term
records provided by these gauges have been invaluable in evaluating climate change
and flood risks. 106 The demand for this sort of long-term baseline information will only
increase as more and more long-term management initiatives are undertaken."°7
Difficult as it is to ensure that those initiatives remain in place for such long time
frames, it is even tougher to maintain the fiscal and political discipline necessary to
support long-term monitoring efforts.108
It is not just baseline data that are not being extracted. Monitoring and evaluation of
the impacts of management actions fall short just as frequently. As Professor Hornstein
points out, "federal administrative agencies have shown relatively little interest in
systematic program evaluation as a general matter."' 9 Monitoring drains scarce
agency resources without providing the political benefits of action. It may even
threaten to scuttle delicate political compromises if it highlights problems with existing
management efforts. As a result, post-decision monitoring of management steps is the
exception rather than the rule, and opportunities for learning are regularly squandered.
Again, just a handful of examples should suffice to make the point: No federal agency
has a systematic program for following up to see if the predictions made in National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) documents turn out to be accurate." 10 The U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers has done little to monitor the effectiveness of wetlands
mitigation efforts."' The Fish and Wildlife Service undertook no analysis of the
effectiveness of its costly condor reintroduction program for more than a decade."
2
available at http://www.peaclaw.org/objects/BPA-finalpetition.pdf.
106. John Schwartz, Experts See Peril in Reduced Monitoring of Nation's Streams and
Rivers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2006, at F3.
107. Incidental take permits issued under the Endangered Species Act, to cite just one
example, run as long as 100 years. In a quick scan of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's online
database of approved incidental take permits, I counted two of 100 years, four of ninety-nine
years, and sixty-eight of fifty years duration. http://ecos.fws.gov/conserv-plans/servlet/
gov.doi.hcp.servlets.PlanReport.
108. See, e.g., Dominick A. DellaSala & Jack E. Williams, Special Section: The Northwest
Forest Plan: a Global Model of Forest Management in Contentious Times, 20 CONSERVATION
BIOLOGY 274, 275 (2006) (noting that proper assessment of the Northwest Forest Plan will
require periodic monitoring "for at least the next 100 years").
109. Donald T. Hornstein, Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative Law, 54
DUKE L.J. 913, 947 (2005).
110. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing
Government's Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903,927 (2002) (noting that in
most cases we never know the actual environmental impacts of actions evaluated under NEPA
because neither federal agencies nor anyone else regularly conduct any follow-up analysis or
monitoring).
111. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMPENSATING FOR WETLAND LOSSES UNDER THE
CLEAN WATER ACT 3 (2001).




For the information pipeline, refining means turning raw data into useful
information. Data are not the same as information or knowledge." 3 Data are numbers
generated by observation, measurement, or modeling. Information implies an
understanding of the significance of those numbers, and knowledge and understanding
of the underlying system itself. Neither of those follows automatically from data,
although both can be derived from it. The key distinction is that information can
improve management, but raw data typically cannot.
One common step in the transition from data to knowledge is boosting the signal-to-
noise ratio by emphasizing the data that mean something and downplaying those that
do not. Reviewing data to make sure they have been accurately measured and recorded
seems like a trivial refining step, but, under pressure to meet performance expectations
on limited budgets, it does not always happen. 114 Beyond that, sorting data may be
essential to accurate interpretation. For example, butterflies spend more time in flight
on calm, warm days than when it is cold and windy. 115 Ideally, therefore, butterfly
population counts should be made during good weather conditions, but at a minimum,
weather conditions during the survey should be recorded with the count numbers and
taken into account in evaluating the significance of those numbers. Rather than being
averaged with others, counts made under poor weather conditions may have to be
ignored.
The appropriate geographic scale for data aggregation must also be determined.
Averaging across too large an area can obscure important distinctions, but focusing on
too small a sample can exaggerate meaningless differences. Exxon is currently
wrangling with the U.S. and Alaska about this sort of data selection. The civil
settlement following the Exxon Valdez oil spill required the company to pay $900
million in restitution for damage to Prince William Sound. It also included a reopener
clause, allowing the state and federal governments to seek up to an additional $100
million for additional damages not anticipated at the time of the settlement. In June
2006, shortly before the reopener period was to expire, the governments submitted
claims for $92 million." 6 Exxon points to hundreds of peer reviewed studies that,
looking at the Sound as a whole, show a healthy recovery. But other studies, which
113. See generally Lee Clarke, Context Dependency and Risk Decision Making, in
ORGANIZATIONS, UNCERTAINTIES, AND RISK 27 (James F. Short, Jr. & Lee Clarke eds., 1992);
Thomas D. Beamish, Accumulating Trouble: Complex Organization, a Culture ofSilence, anda
Secret Spill, 47 Soc. PRos. 473, 479 (2000).
114. See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FOREST SERVICE: BETTER DATA ARE
NEEDED TO IDENTIFY AND PRIORITIZE REFORESTATION AND TIMBER STAND IMPROVEMENT NEEDS,
GAO-05-374, at 16-17 (2005) (noting that in the reforestation program "data are not reviewed
for accuracy and when errors are found they are not always corrected" because officials
"emphasize addressing needs rather than accurately identifying and reporting them").
115. THoMAs REID Assocs., SAN BRUNO MOUNTAIN HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN, 1997
AcTvIms REPORT 6 (Jan. 1998).
116. Felicity Barringer, $92 Million More Is Soughtfor Exxon Valdez Cleanup, N.Y. TIMES,
June 2, 2006, at A14.
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focused on the portions of the Sound that were hardest hit by the spill, conclude that oil
lingers and wildlife have not recovered."i
7
Statistical tests are another tool for sorting data to boost the signal-to-noise ratio.
Statistics are used both to convert data gathered from multiple observations to a best
guess at an actual property of the system, such as the size of a population of
management concern, and to decide whether observations support inferences about the
system, such as whether the population is shrinking over time. 118 Statistical analysis
always incorporates expert judgments, either explicitly, as in Bayesian analysis, or
implicitly, as with the choice of statistical confidence levels in frequentist analysis."19
Closely related to statistical analysis are representations of uncertainty and
determinations about how to express data. Rigidly applying frequentist statistical tests
can lead to flat statements that a result is significant, implying that decision makers
should give it great weight, or that it is not significant, implying that they should give it
none. Both judgments can be misleading, obscuring the ultimate question of the weight
to be assigned to differing data,120a question best answered on a sliding scale rather
than with a yes/no choice.
The format in which data are expressed as they are passed along to decision makers
can also be important. In the fisheries context, Eagle and Thompson suggest that
presenting regional fishery management councils with a range of potentially acceptable
catch levels encourages the adoption of quotas at or above the top of the range
presented, increasing the risk of overfishing. 121 They suggest instead that the data
should be expressed in terms of the probability that any particular quota will result in
overfishing. 
22
Refining is an essential aspect of the information supply pipeline. Raw data are
simply not a useful basis for most decisions. Refining involves a great deal of
judgment, however, and therefore introduces the possibility of hidden biases and
systematic errors. As part of the process for making natural resource management or
other policy decisions, the refining step bears close scrutiny in order to highlight the
judgments made, who made them, and on what basis. 23
117. Elizabeth Arnold, Valdez: The Damage Persists, 17 Years Later, National Public Radio,
Weekend Edition (Apr. 15, 2006), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=5344108.
118. David E. Adelman, Scientific Activism and Restraint: The Interplay of Statistics,
Judgment, and Procedure in Environmental Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 497,506-07 (2004).
Professor Adelman's paper is the most complete and accessible explanation of the techniques
and uses of statistics in the legal literature.
119. See id. at 563-75 (describing judgment in Bayesian analysis), 541-59 (describing
judgment in frequentist analysis).
120. Id. at 559.
121. Josh Eagle & Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Answering Lord Perry's Question: Dissecting
Regulatory Overfishing, 46 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 649, 671-72 (2003).
122. Id. at 672-73.
123. See generally Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Science, Judgment, and Controversy
in Natural Resource Regulation, 26 PUBLIC LAND & REsouRCES L. REV. 1 (2005); Holly
Doremus, Using Science in a Political World: The Importance of Transparency in Natural
Resource Regulation, in RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS (Wendy Wagner & Rena Steinzor
eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2006).
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4. Blending
Blending is the combination of data or information from various sources. It is
virtually unheard of for data collected at a single time in a single location by a single
entity to supply by itself all the information relevant to a management decision. As
Richard Norgaard and Paul Baer explain: "The modem human predicament can be
described as the challenge of taking informed action . . .based on the whole of
knowledge, in a world in which knowledge, both practical and scientific, is highly
fragmented and dispersed."'' 2 4 Typically, informed decision making requires the
synthesis of disparate information streams. Three different sorts of blending are
important to natural resource decisions.
The first is synthesis of similar data collected at different places or times. Long-
term or large-scale trends can only be detected and understood if data are aggregated
and evaluated together. Aggregation, though, is neither automatic nor simple. The
production of natural resource data in the United States, like natural resource
management, is highly decentralized. Information is produced by state governments,
private entities, and a wide variety of federal agencies. Not surprisingly, these different
entities, driven by different goals, tend to collect different data, and even to store it in
different formats. It is difficult even to compile data for broader comparisons; there
simply are not readily available databases either of conservation data or of research
studies that have been conducted. 125 It may be difficult for one agency to find out what
data another has gathered. In the rare cases where data can be located and assembled,
differences in methodology can still make comparisons difficult or impossible.
Information fragmentation also occurs within individual federal agencies. In the
Forest Service, for example, data about reforestation needs are collected and compiled
at hundreds of district offices under loose regional and national direction. 126 The
resulting data are sufficiently inconsistent that they "cannot be meaningfully
aggregated at the national level."1 27 Even within individual offices, decisions made by
different persons or at different times can fail to integrate information, increasing the
likelihood that cumulative effects will be missed. 128
The second type of blending involves analogizing or extrapolating from data
collected under one set of circumstances to other circumstances. Under the right
circumstances, data drawn from one situation can be combined with knowledge about
another to draw reasonably robust conclusions about the second situation despite the
absence of direct data. It is, needless to say, a tricky business. Both the need for and
124. Norgaard & Baer, supra note 5, at 953.
125. Shaffer et al., supra note 5, at 137.
126. U.S. Gov'T AccoUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 114, at 7-8.
127. Id. at 14.
128. It does not help that permit applicants may be motivated to obscure, or at least not to
highlight, similarities. For example, two environmental assessments prepared by the same
consultant and submitted on the same day in support of incidental take permit applications for
the Utah prairie dog in almost precisely the same place contain no mention of each other.
Environmental Assessment for the Issuance of an Incidental Take Permit for the Utah Prairie
Dog by the West Hills L.L.C. (June 16, 1995) (on file with author); Environmental Assessment
for Issuance of an Incidental Take Permit for the Utah Prairie Dog by the Coleman Company,
Inc. (June 16, 1995) (on file with author).
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the challenges of extrapolation are well known in the toxics regulation context, where
regulators must estimate the impacts of low doses on human beings from data on high
dose animal exposures. 129 In the natural resource context, the analogous need is for
extrapolation from one species or system to another. "Nearly nothing is known,
quantitatively, about the population ecology of the vast majority of species."',
30
Potentially, careful study of a representative cross section of species could provide
models for similar but less-studied species; at the moment, however, there is no
established methodology for making this leap. 131
The third important type of blending is the combination of data and interpretations
from multiple disciplinary perspectives. 132 Natural resource problems cannot be solved
without some understanding of the way ecosystems function. That understanding
inevitably requires "the insights of a variety of disciplinary experts."'
' 33
Different disciplinary backgrounds not only allow people to address distinct facets
of complex problems, they affect problem definitions and priorities. These differences
provide a good part of the value of cross-disciplinary input, but also multiply its
challenges. Environmental problems are "wicked," to use the terminology of Rittel and
Webber, in the sense that they cannot be objectively defined. 134 The nature of the
problem, and therefore what counts as a solution, are in the eye of the beholder.' 
35
Consider, for example, how many different answers there might be to the question of
what would constitute a well-managed national forest, or how the waters of a river
129. See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L. REv.
335,340 (2006); Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM.
L. REv. 1613, 1625-27 (1995); Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A
Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 562, 571-73 & n.43
(1992).
130. Shaffer et al., supra note 5, at 136.
131. See id. ("Whether or not [a cross section of species] could legitimately serve as models
for other, unstudied species of similar life history ... may bear further consideration.").
132. Fine distinctions are sometimes drawn between inter-, multi-, cross-, and trans-
disciplinary approaches. See Svein Jentoft, Beyond Fisheries Management: The Phronetic
Dimension, 30 MARINE POL'Y 671, 675-76 (2006) (citing numerous useful sources). See
generally Gabriele Bammer, Integration and Implementation Sciences: Building a New
Specialization, 10(2) ECOLOGY & SOC'Y 6 (2005) available at
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol 10/iss2/art6/. For purposes of this paper, the distinctions
are not significant. The point is that no individual discipline can solve any important resource
problem by itself. Connections of some sort must be made between disciplines.
133. Peter W. Cullen, Richard H. Norris, Vincent H. Resh, Trefor B. Reynoldson, David M.
Rosenberg, & Michael T. Barbour, Collaboration in Scientific Research: A Critical Need for
Freshwater Ecology, 42 FRESHWATER BIOLOGY 131, 132 (1999). See generally NAT'L RES.
COUNCIL, FACILITATING INTERDISCIPLINARY RES. (2005); Warren Gold, Kern Ewing, John
Banks, Martha Groom, Tom Hinckley, David Secord, & Daniela Shebitz, Collaborative
Ecological Restoration, 312 SCIENCE 1880, 1880 (2006) ("The complexity of the interface
between human communities and ecological sustainability demands that we supersede our
traditional, balkanized disciplines."); David W. Orr, The Problem ofDisciplines / The Discipline
of Problems, 7 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 10, 10 (1993) ("The great ecological issues of our time
have to do in one way or another with our failure to see things in their entirety.").
134. Horst W.J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, 4
POL'Y SCI. 155, 160-67 (1973).
135. See Doremus, supra note 2, at 332-33.
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should be divided among different users. People trained in different fields tend to
define wicked problems and their solutions differently,' 36 in part because they are
motivated by differing values but also because human beings are prone to exaggerate
the importance of their own skills, and hence the skills of their disciplinary
specialty. 1
37
Disciplinary training also affects data interpretations. The meanings assigned to
data depend upon the background of other knowledge against which they are
seen, 138and people with different training bring different backgrounds. The value of
particular experiments, and the relative importance of different types of error, will
seem different through different disciplinary lenses, as the starkly divergent views
taken by physical oceanographers and marine biologists of proposals for acoustic
measurement of ocean temperatures in the 1980s demonstrate.' 39 Only with both
perspectives participating could a full view of the pros and cons of the proposed
measurements emerge.
5. Distribution
Distribution is the transmission of data, knowledge, or information (before or after
the refining and blending steps) to others. Distribution is critical to the scientific
enterprise itself, as well as to the effective use of science in policy. As James Secord
puts it, science is "knowledge in transit."' 14° Yet the circulation of knowledge is no
more automatic than its creation. Distribution can occur through publication in journals
or as white papers, circulation of drafts, presentations at conferences, postings on web
pages, and conversations. Obviously, information has to reach decision makers in order
to be used. But reaching other audiences can also be important. Communication is an
essential step in the scientific process itself, because it allows other scientists to test,
extend, refute, and modify earlier findings or conclusions. 141
136. See generally Sharachchandra 1,16 & Richard B. Norgaard, Practicing
Interdisciplinarity, 55 BIOSCIENCE 967 (2005).
137. See Degnbol et al., supra note 69, at 534 (noting the tendency of disciplines to
encourage "tunnel vision" in problem and solution framing); Andrew Sobel, Comments on
Globalization, Interdisciplinary Research, Myopia and Parochialism, Government,
Convergence, and Culture, 9 J. INT'LMGMT. 419,421 (2003) (noting that academics who have
chosen to focus on globalization tend to overstate the importance of global effects and
underemphasize the influence of local processes).
138. See David N. Livingstone, Science, Text, and Space: Thoughts on the Geography of
Reading, 30 TRANSACTIONS INST. BRIT. GEOGRAPHERS 391,393 (2005) ("Readers come to texts
with different reading histories, and read in the light of their literary genealogies. The meaning
that any new work has for an individual reader is shaped by the other texts and theories and
practices they have engaged. Meaning bleeds, as it were, from one text to another.").
139. See Daniel Sarewitz, How Science Makes Environmental Controversies Worse, 7
ENVTL. SCI. & POL'Y 385, 390-92 (2004) (noting that oceanographers thought the potential
value of data from acoustic measurements outweighed the possibility of harm to marine
mammals, but marine biologists disagreed).
140. See generally James A. Secord, Knowledge in Transit, 95 Isis 654 (2004) (calling for
historians of science to embrace the centrality to science of the circulation of knowledge).
141. See ScoTr L. MONTGOMERY, THE CHICAGO GUIDE TO COMMUNICATING SCIENCE 1
(2002) ("Communicating is the doing of science.").
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In recent years, scientists at several federal agencies have complained that their
superiors have deliberately inhibited broad communication of their results or scientific
views. NASA climate scientist James Hansen made headlines when he charged that the
Bush administration had tried to prevent him from speaking out about global warming
after he gave a public lecture calling for CO2 emission reductions. 142 Climate
researchers at other agencies also report that they were told not to speak out or required
to get clearance from their superiors before speaking to journalists. 43 Perceptions of
silencing extend to other natural resource scientists as well. A pair of surveys
conducted by the Union of Concerned Scientists in 2005 revealed that close to half of
the respondents at the Fish and Wildlife Service and NOAA Fisheries did not feel free
to publicly express concerns about the conservation needs of species under their charge
"without fear of retaliation." 144
The reluctance of federal agencies to share data relevant to resource management
can extend not just to public communication but to requests by research scientists for
data that could be used to evaluate management efforts. 145 In part, this reluctance may
spring simply from defensiveness and "reluctance to submit to the sometimes
withering criticism of the peer review process,"' 4 a process to which agency personnel
are not typically accustomed. The tendency to hold data close to the vest may be
exacerbated in the case of high-profile resource conflicts by fear that outside studies
might threaten management compromises that seem politically stable or undermine
claimed management successes. Failure to provide full information to reviewers
obviously can undermine the integrity and limit the usefulness of outside reviews. It
can happen even where review is mandated by law or undertaken by advisory groups
appointed by the agency itself. For example, in the course of deciding how to regulate
142. Andrew C. Revkin, Climate Expert Says NASA Triedto Silence Him, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
29, 2006, at 1. NASA quickly undertook a review of its communication policies, and
subsequently acknowledged that it had wrongly denied a media request to interview Hansen.
Andrew C. Revkin, Scientists Commend NASA's Progress on Communications, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 14, 2006, at 1; U.S. Federal News, NASA Admits Wrongdoing in Not Allowing Top
Scientist to Discuss Climate Change Research, June 9, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR
9943137.
143. Juliet Eilperin, Climate Researchers Feeling Heatfrom White House, WASH. POST, Apr.
6, 2000, at A27.
144. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, SURVEY OF U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE
ECOLOGICAL SERVICES EMPLOYEES (undated), http://www.ucsusa.org/scientific-integrity/
interferencelus-fish-wildlife-service-survey.html (29.2 percent of respondents disagreed and
12.8 percent strongly disagreed with the statement "Outside the agency I can openly express my
concerns about the biological needs of species and habitats without fear of retaliation"); Union
of Concerned Scientists, SURVEY OF NOAA FISHERIES SERVICE EMPLOYEES (2005),
http://www.ucsusa.org/scientific-integrity/interference/survey-political-interference-at-noaa-fis
heries.html (21.8 percent disagree and 17.7 percent strongly disagree with a similar statement).
There are plenty of anecdotal stories suggesting that these fears are not without foundation. See,
e.g., Fischman & Meretsky, supra note 6, at 101 (scientist who had been critical of grizzly bear
recovery program "had his office files removed, computer documents deleted, his mail
screened, and his travel budget slashed").
145. See Fischman & Meretsky, supra note 6, at 101 (noting difficulties outside scientist had
in getting data for a study on grizzly recovery).
146. Id. at 96.
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the herbicide atrazine, EPA convened two advisory committees of outside scientists
but asked each only to consider a small fraction of the information EPA had available.
In that way, EPA was able to skew the reviews so that they seemed to provide credible
outside support for EPA's policy choice. 1
47
Legislators from both parties have expressed concern about restrictions on
communication of agency science. Democrats have asked the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) to investigate allegations of silencing, 14 8 and have
introduced legislation to protect agency scientists from censorship or tampering with
their scientific work. ' 49 Republican Senator John McCain asked the National Science
Board, which provides independent advice to the National Science Foundation (NSF),
to examine federal agency policies concerning the suppression or distortion of
scientific research findings. The Board responded that no uniform policy exists, and
recommended that all federal research agencies "establish policies and procedures to
encourage open exchange of data and results of research conducted by agency
scientists, while preventing the intentional or unintentional suppression or distortion of
research findings .... "150
Congress has itself contributed to limits on data transmission. In December 2000, it
passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001151 with a brief rider known as the
Information Quality Act (IQA). '52 The IQA directed the Office of Management and
Budget (0MB) to issue guidelines for "ensuring and maximizing the quality,
objectivity, utility, and integrity of information . . . disseminated by Federal
agencies." 153 Agencies must also provide an administrative procedure for review of
information alleged not to meet the IQA's standards.' 54 Information is clearly
"disseminated" if it is posted on the agency's web site or incorporated into a
publication or brochure. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) believes
information is also "disseminated" for purposes of the IQA if it is used in the course of
a rulemaking proceeding. 155 There is no way to reliably tell how much the IQA has
147. Jennifer Beth Sass and Aaron Colangelo, European Union Bans Atrazine, While the
United States Negotiates Continued Use, 12 INT'L J. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH 260,265 (2006).
148. Press Release, Wu Requests GAO to Investigate Scientific Manipulation & Censorship,
(May 2, 2006), http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/or0l-wu/pr05O22006GAO.html; Press
Release, Mikulski Says Integrity of Federal Science Agencies Must Not Be Compromised, (Feb.
17, 2006), http://mikulski.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=251712.
149. Restore Scientific Integrity to Federal Research and Policymaking Act, H.R. 839, 109th
Cong. (2005). Democrats in the House Committee on Science fell just short in a recent attempt
to add much of the language of Waxman's bill to H.R. 5450, a proposed organic act for the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. House of Representatives, Committee on
Science, Democratic Caucus, Press Release, Committee Reports NOAA Organization Bill -
Again, (June 14, 2006), http:llsciencedems.house.gov/press/PRArticle.aspx?NewslD=l 141.
150. Memorandum to Members of the National Science Board, Major Actions and
Approvals at the May 10, 2006 Meeting, NSB-06-60, May 12, 2006, Attachment 4,
http:llwww.nsf.gov/nsb/meetings/2006/0509/major__actions.pdf.
151. 44 U.S.C. § 3516 (2000).
152. Id. § 3516(a).
153. Id.
154. Id. § 3516(b)(2)(B).
155. Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity
of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. 8451, 8460
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affected federal data communication. Most administrative IQA challenges have been
unsuccessful,156 and federal courts have held that the IQA provides no private right of
action. 157 Only a few instances of removal of information from the public record
following IQA challenges have been documented,158 and in a handful of other cases
IQA complaints have apparently led to the addition of more information. 159 Because
the IQA imposes pre-dissemination requirements and raises the specter of potential
post-dissemination challenge, however, it is possible that agencies are self-censoring,
conserving their resources by choosing not to disseminate information they think might
be challenged.16° Whatever its impact, the IQA approach may be spreading. As of
2004, the Congressional Research Service reported that Wisconsin had adopted
legislation similar to the IQA, and other states were planning to do so.161
Outside researchers can also contribute to distribution shortfalls. The culture and
reward system of academic science may make researchers reluctant to share
preliminary data before they have had the opportunity to fully analyze it themselves,
and to document their analysis in peer-reviewed publications.' 62 That process can be
slow, both before and after submission of manuscripts. Refusing to release data until
formal publication, therefore, can substantially delay communication.
Communication is not simply the responsibility of the creator or the refiner of
information. End users of information should be active seekers. Regulators, for
example, can reasonably be expected to conduct thorough searches of the peer-
reviewed literature, which is available to anyone with the expertise to search it and
good library access. Sometimes there are shortfalls even at this fairly rudimentary
search level, perhaps because agencies are under time pressure, have limited personnel,
do not offer sufficient training, or do not have ready access to library resources.
(Feb. 22, 2006). Some knowledgeable commentators disagree. Sidney A. Shapiro, The
Information Quality Act and Environmental Protection: The Perils ofReform by Appropriations
Rider, 28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 339, 363-67 (2004).
156. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND REGULATORY
AFFAIRS, INFORMATION QUALITY: A REPORT TO CONGRESS, FISCAL YEAR 2003, at 8, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/infopoltech.html#iq [hereinafter OMB, 2003 REPORT].
157. Salt Inst. v. Leavitt, 440 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 2006).
158. See CURTIS W. COPELAND & MICHAEL SIMPSON, THE INFORMATION QUALITY ACT:
OMB's GUIDANCE AND INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION 16-17 (Updated Sept. 17, 2004), available at
http://www.ombwatch.org/info/dataquality/ RL32532_CRSDQA.pdf (reporting that the
National Institute on Aging changed its website and printed publications, eliminating statements
that smokeless tobacco was as dangerous as cigarettes); Johnson, supra note 18, at 43 (reporting
that EPA "removed a soil database from the Internet" in response to an IQA challenge).
159. Copeland & Simpson, supra note 158, at 12-13.
160. In a report to Congress on the first year of the IQA's operation, OMB asserted that it
had no evidence that the IQA had reduced the number of agency information disseminations.
OMB, 2003 REPORT, supra note 156, at 10. OMB Watch, in a response to OMB's report,
pointed out that there was equally no evidence that agency disseminations had not been chilled,
and reason to suspect that the resource-intensive IQA process might be chilling agency
communication of information. OMB WATCH, THE REALITY OF DATA QUALITY ACT'S FIRST
YEAR: A CORRECTION OF OMB's REPORT TO CONGRESS 10-11 (July 2004).
161. Copeland & Simpson, supra note 158, at 17.




Shortfalls in information location by managers can sometimes be corrected by
participants in the regulatory process, who have incentives and opportunity to bring
relevant literature to the attention of regulators. But if the treasure hunt is more
difficult, end users and stakeholders may be unable to find relevant information even
with a diligent, well-financed search. Unfortunately, much information that is extracted
and refined is never archived in a way that makes it available for management efforts.
Management agencies themselves are prime offenders. Millions of federal dollars
are spent every year to generate environmental assessments and environmental impact
statements, which contain background information on a wide variety of systems, as
well as predictions which could be tested in retrospect. Those documents effectively
disappear into a bookcase or file cabinet after the decision is made to take or not take
the specific action they evaluate. Although we are well into the "information age," no
centralized database collects environmental documents so that future researchers and
managers can learn from them. 163 Even in California, where by law environmental
impact assessments must be submitted to a state clearinghouse, they are not maintained
in any form readily available to the public. 164 Other environmental documents are
similarly unavailable. No database archives habitat conservation plans or biological
opinions prepared under the Endangered Species Act, for example. Like environmental
assessments, some of these documents are available on a hit-or-miss basis over the
internet, particularly when they are first prepared, but there is no way to systematically
search for or through them without making a series of pilgrimages to the offices where
they were prepared. Even for those motivated to make such pilgrimages, there is no
guarantee that copies of documents will be available promptly, or even that the
responsible offices will have complete documents on hand. 165
The systematic failure to archive resource management and environmental
documents, a task that should be relatively easy given modern electronic tools, is a
major leak in the information supply pipeline, spilling useful information out before it
can reach those who might use it. Among other things, this particular leak forces
resource managers to repeatedly re-invent the wheel, makes retrospective evaluations
of prior actions virtually impossible, complicates the discovery and evaluation of
cumulative impacts, and keeps forecasting techniques from advancing.
Distribution requires not only the transmission of information, but its transmission
in a form accessible to and useful for the recipient. Depending upon the audience, it
may be essential that the presentation clearly address key management questions. 166
163. Daniel A. Farber, Bringing Environmental Assessment into the Digital Age, 10-16
(2006), UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 877625, available through Social Science
Research Network at http://papers.ssm.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=877625.
164. Id. at 12-13.
165. In the course of a recent study of habitat conservation plans, my co-authors and I found
that the documentation for fully one-third of them was not complete even at the regional Fish
and Wildlife Service office that had approved them. See Matthew Rahn et al., Species Coverage
in Multi-Species Habitat Conservation Plans: Where's the Science?, 56 BIOSCIENCE 613, 614
(2006).
166. See, e.g., NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, COMMITTEE TO IMPROVE THE U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY
NAT'L WATER QUALrrY ASSESSMENT PROGRAM, OPPORTUNITIES TO IMPROVE THE U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY NAT'L WATER QUALrrY ASSESSMENT PROGRAM 13 (2002) (pointing out
that explicit answers to key questions about the nation's water quality would be "particularly
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Managers often find it difficult to point researchers in useful directions, because they
may not have the training or experience to determine which fields, approaches, or
techniques will prove most useful. 67 At the same time, researchers may show limited




Finally, there is the consumption stage, the actual use of knowledge to make,
modify, or rescind management decisions. It might seem like consumption should
follow automatically if information is adequately refined and distributed to the
decisionmaker in a timely manner. Unfortunately, even at this step there is
considerable room for slippage.
It is important to note at the outset that decisions that do not follow the
recommendations of scientific advisors do not necessarily represent failures of
consumption. Conservation is rarely if ever the only societal goal to be considered. In
some cases, decision makers may simply decide that other goals, including economic
efficiency, some vision of fairness, or even public distaste for necessary conservation
measures, outweigh conservation of the resource. So, for example, land managers in
the Channel Islands might decide not to implement lethal control measures against
golden eagles, even though they understand the potential for eagles to eradicate the
island fox. Or Great Britain might not change its badger-culling strategy, even though
according to a scientific advisory group that strategy "cannot contribute constructively
to the control of bovine TB., 169 I am not defending such decisions. They may be
incorrect in a variety of ways. They may well represent failures to fully or correctly
articulate societal values and goals, failures of the political process, or failures of
institutions to hold policy actors to their assigned tasks. Even if they are "wrong," by
some or all of these measures, however, decisions made with access to and
consideration of all reasonably available data cannot be classified as failures to put
informational fuel in the tank.
Consumption failures are situations in which information is ignored, misinterpreted,
or not given appropriate weight despite being put before decision makers in a timely
fashion. The most extreme version is flat out refusal to consider relevant information.
As Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service's Southwestern Regional Office, Dale
Hall (now Director of the entire Service), issued a memorandum limiting the use of
genetic data in endangered species recovery planning. 70 The memo was widely
interpreted as forbidding any consideration of advances in understanding of the
species' genetics after its listing. 171
valuable to Congress, policy makers, resource managers, and the public.").
167. Peter W. Cullen et al., Collaboration in Scientific Research: A Critical Need for
Freshwater Ecology, 42 FRESHWATER BIOLOGY 131, 136 (1999).
168. Id.
169. INDEPENDENT ScIENTIc GROUP ON CATTLE TB, Report of the Work of the Group & Its
Published Findings, 2-3 (2005).
170. Memorandum from H. Dale Hall to Assistant Regional Director, Ecological Services,
Albuquerque, N.M., Policy on Genetics in Endangered Species Activities (Jan. 27, 2005),
available at http://www.peer.org/docs/fws/05 24_5_hallmemo.pdf.
171. See Felicity Barringer, New Rules on Endangered Species in the Southwest, N.Y.
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The genetics memo could be the tip of the iceberg in what seems to be a growing
phenomenon: the import of an extreme interpretation of the Supreme Court's
Daubert172 decision to the internal decision-making processes of administrative
agencies. In Daubert, the Court directed federal judges to take on a stronger
gatekeeping function for expert scientific testimony in order to ensure that any
scientific evidence put before a jury is both relevant and reliable. Daubert emphasized
that the judicial inquiry must be flexible, but listed several factors judges might
consider, including whether the relevant technique or theory is testable, whether it has
been subject to peer review and publication, its known or potential error rate, and its
degree of acceptance within the scientific community. 173 The Daubert standard is
specific to the courtroom, both as a matter of law and as a matter of principle. As a
matter of law, the Court derived the Daubert test from the Federal Rules of Evidence,
which apply only to litigation in federal courts. 174 As a matter of principle, the Court
recognized that its Daubert rule might not always advance the search for truth, 75 but
essentially concluded that juries are not equipped to carry out the search for scientific
truth and must be protected against exposure to evidence that could provide an excuse
for irrational decisions. 1
76
TIMES, May 24, 2005, at A13 ("Dale Hall ... said that all decisions about how to return a
species to robust viability must use only the genetic science in place at the time it was put on the
endangered species list.., even if there have been scientific advances in understanding the
genetic makeup of a species and its subgroups in the ensuing years."); Letter to Dale Hall,
Policy on Genetics in Endangered Species Activities (June 20, 2005), available at
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/scientific-integrity/GeneticsLetter-I.pdf ("As time
passes scientists typically obtain better knowledge of the threats facing endangered species and
the conservation actions needed to recover them .... [The Service] would be remiss in its
scientific duty if it ignored this scientific knowledge simply because it was not known at the
time of or discussed in the listing rule .... [T]he preclusion by policy fiat of the large body of
scientific information, in genetic or population-based conservation strategies will often prevent
recovery teams and the Service from using the best available scientific information."); Letter
from Ralph 0. Morgenweck, Regional Director, Region 6, to Regional Director, Region 2,
Policy on Genetics in Endangered Species Activities (Mar. 11, 2005), available at
http://www.peer.org/docs/fws/05 24_5_morgenweck.pdf ("Limiting the Fish and Wildlife
Service's ability to base recovery criteria on the protection of genetic variation contradicts
requirements for the Service to use the best available science in decision making. We often
discover new information about the biology of a species after its listing .... Restricting the use
of genetic information discovered after the final listing unnecessarily restricts the Service's
ability to design a recovery plan that would best conserve the species.").
172. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
173. Id. at 593-94.
174. The Court derived its test from Federal Rules of Evidence 402 and 702. Id. at 589,597.
Rule 702 has been amended since the Daubert decision, in a way that may or may not codify it.
See Anthony Z. Roisman, Procedural Aspects of Daubert, Environmental and Toxic Tort
Litigation, ALI-ABA CLE Course of Study, Jan. 26-27, 2006, available on Westlaw at SL080
ALI-ABA 101 ("Essentially, all the 2000 amendment has done is introduce more confusion into
a subject that clearly did not need it.").
175. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596-97.
176. I have speculated previously that the Daubert Court may have been trying to keep out
evidence that is probably not right, based on an underlying assumption that juries are
systematically inclined to favor injured plaintiffs over deep-pocket defendants in the kinds of
tort cases that gave rise to Daubert. Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Future of the
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Administrative agencies are not subject either to the Federal Rules of Evidence or to
the irrationalities that many would say plague the jury system. Since Daubert came
down, however, anti-regulatory interests have been trying to import it into the
administrative arena. Some have argued that a Daubert-like approach should be used
to pierce traditional deference to agency scientific decisions in judicial review, making
judges actively police the scientific information on which agencies rely to defend their
decisions. 177 Given the doctrinal disjunction and the entrenched status of deference to
technical decisions within the judiciary, I don't expect those arguments to enjoy wide
success any time soon. 178
Agencies can change their. .nternal procedures more nimbly than the judiciary can
alter precedent, however, and they have been under pressure to do so. The U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, for example, has called for an Executive Order "to require
federal agencies to apply Daubert standards in the administrative rulemaking
process."' 179 No such Executive Order has been forthcoming, but there are signs that
some agencies are adopting an "exclusionary rule" for scientific evidence they
perceive as not up to their stringent interpretation of the Daubert standards. When EPA
began the process of revising its air quality criteria for lead, for example, it invited
submission only of "research studies that have been published, accepted for
publication, or presented at a public scientific meeting,"' 180 a standard that would
exclude far more evidence than Daubert itself.
Although the Information Quality Act (IQA) directly addresses communication, it
seems to have an indirect chilling effect on information consumption (as indeed it was
probably intended to do). Wendy Wagner has described the IQA as imposing "an
evidentiary screening process on regulatory agencies that looks very much like the
courts' Daubert test."' 8'1 Stephen Johnson documents situations in which agencies
faced with IQA challenges have altered or delayed substantive decisions on protection
of endangered species, pesticide regulation, and guidance on asbestos risks. 182 0MB
Watch reports that the Mine Safety Health Administration decided to phase in a rule
Endangered Species Act's Best Available Science Mandate, 34 ENvTL. L. 397, 414 (2004).
177. This argument has been made by environmental interests as well as foes of regulation.
Patricia Smith King, Applying Daubert to the "Hard Look" Requirement of NEPA: Scientific
Evidence Before the Forest Service in Sierra Club v. Marita, 2 Wis. ENVTL. L.J. 147 (1995);
Paul S. Miller & Bert W. Rein, "Gatekeeping" Agency Reliance on Scientific and Technical
Materials After Daubert: Ensuring Relevance and Reliability in the Administrative Process, 17
TouRo L. REV. 297 (2000); Alan Charles Raul & Julie Zampa Dwyer, "Regulatory Daubert, "A
Proposal to Enhance Judicial Review ofAgency Science by Incorporating Daubert Principles
Into Administrative Law, 66 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (2003).
178. Even in the courts, the Daubert pendulum may have swung too far. According to one
recent study, "courts are now asking doctors who testify as experts to meet standards that
exceed those that the doctors use to diagnose and treat their own patients." David Michaels &
Celeste Monforton, Scientific Evidence in the Regulatory System: Manufacturing Uncertainty
and the Demise of the Formal Regulatory System, 13 J.L. & POL'Y 17, 39 (2002) (citing Jerome
P. Kassirer & Joe S. Cecil, Inconsistency in Evidentiary Standards for Medical Testimony:
Disorder in the Courts, 288 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1382, 1382-87 (2002)).
179. U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Scientific Information in Federal Rulemaking,
http://www.uschamber.com/issues/index/regulatory/scientific-rulemaking.htm.
180. EPA, Air Quality Criteria Document for Lead, 69 Fed. Reg. 7835 (Nov. 9, 2004).
181. Wagner, supra note 75,at 590-91.
182. Johnson, supra note 18, at 43-44.
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intended to protect miners from exposure to diesel emissions over six years, instead of
one, after an IQA challenge.' 83 Such reports, of course, provide only limited
information. They do not reveal whether the IQA challenges brought real weaknesses
in the information to the attention of regulators, or instead bullied regulators into
ignoring useful information.
Even without formal IQA or Daubert-type barriers, regulators sometimes shy away
from considering relevant information. In 2002, for example, the National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS, now known as NOAA Fisheries) had to decide whether or
not to list killer whales (Orcinus orca) in the Puget Sound area as an endangered or
threatened "distinct population segment."184 That decision required NMFS to make a
judgment about orca taxonomy, because according to agency policy a distinct
population segment must be significant "to the species to which it belongs."' 85 The
taxonomic community, at the time of the decision and today, formally recognizes only
one, global, species of killer whale. According to NMFS scientists, however, that
taxonomy is outdated and does not accurately reflect the biology of the killer whale.
NMFS' scientific review team found that at least two taxa should be recognized in the
North Pacific. 186 Nonetheless, NMFS used the global species as the comparison taxon.
Not surprisingly, it found that the Puget Sound whales were not significant to that
taxon. Accordingly, it declined to list the whales.' 87 A cynical explanation is that
NMFS was simply looking for an excuse to avoid listing the Puget Sound whales,
whose protection might bring restrictions on a variety of activities. But there may be
more to it than that. Members of the NMFS review team agreed that the established
taxonomy was wrong, but could not agree on what should replace it. 188 Yet any
decision not based on the old taxonomy would require NMFS to settle on an
alternative. Faced with the difficult, and undoubtedly controversial, task of
constructing an improved taxonomy, NMFS preferred to retreat to the shelter of a
published standard, even one it knew to be wrong.
Failures of consumption may also occur because decision makers do not trust
information. That can happen if the information comes from a source decision makers
do not regard as credible, such as someone with a financial interest in the regulatory
outcome, or if key stakeholders are excluded from the information production
process. 189 Nonconsumption, of course, is only problematic if the rejected information
183. OMB Watch, Industry Derails Labor Safety Rule with Data Quality Challenge,
http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/3161/1/231 ?TopicID=1.
184. The ESA allows the listing of species, subspecies, and distinct population segments of
vertebrate species. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16).
185. Policy Regarding the Recognition of Distinct Vertebrate Population Segments Under
the Endangered Species Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 4722, 4725 (Feb. 7, 1966).
186. Center for Biological Diversity v. Lohn, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1232-33 (W.D. Wash.
2003), vacated as moot, 483 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2007).
187. Id. at 1233. The District Court remanded that decision, ruling that reliance on the
outdated taxonomy violated the ESA's requirement that listing decisions be made on the basis
of the best available scientific information. Id. at 1236-37.
188. Four different possibilities for taxonomic revision received roughly equal support
within the review team. Id. at 1233.
189. See, e.g. Cash et al., supra note 25 (explaining that information will not be used in
decisions unless it is regarded as credible, legitimate, and salient); David W. Cash, Innovative
Natural Resource Management: Nebraska's Modelfor Linking Science and Decision Making,
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is in fact reliable, or at least more reliable than other sources. But regulators who find
themselves faced with dueling studies championed by impassioned advocates may be
paralyzed. Suspicion of the motives of the advocates may carry over to suspicion of the
substance of the information they are pushing.' 90
Finally, information will only be used effectively if decision makers have the
capacity to properly evaluate it. In part, this problem can be addressed by careful
refining and communication, but in some circumstances there is no substitute for
agency personnel with the ability to perceive the significance of information for their
regulatory responsibilities and goals.' 9' Those personnel must be given adequate time
to find and evaluate information. The strict deadlines that apply to many regulatory
actions under the ESA, for example, combined with inadequate staffing, can make it
very difficult to fully evaluate and make good use of all available information.
II. REPAIRS AND PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE
What lessons should we draw from this tour through the steps in the information
supply chain? At the most general level, it's helpful to recognize that the information
gap problem (like most policy problems) is not monolithic and therefore is not likely to
be susceptible to any single universal fix. Diagnosing and repairing problems is hard,
context-specific work. It is not enough for managers to say simply "we need more
information" and pass the buck to scientists, or for that matter for scientists to say
"you're not taking our advice" and pass the buck the other way.
Although it's not easy, neither is the situation hopeless. It's not the case that the
current existence of information gaps necessarily means that we can't bring scientific
information to bear, or that we are doomed to simply wait and hope for new
ENVRONMENT, Dec. 2003, at 8, 15-16 (noting that Nebraska model provided credible, policy-
relevant scientific output by combining input from hydrologists, geologists, economists, crop
scientists, farmers, and water users with modeling expertise of U.S. Geological Survey).
190. Opposing sides in environmental and natural resources disputes these days regularly
accuse each other's technical experts of "advocacy science," in which the conclusion is
predetermined and the evidence selectively cited or interpreted to match. Funding can drive
advocacy science; Sheldon Krimsky cites studies providing evidence that funding sources are
correlated with conclusions in drug studies. Sheldon Krimsky, The Funding Effect in Science
and Its Implications for the Judiciary, 13 J.L. & POL'y 43, 57-61 (2005). In the natural
resources context, deep commitment to a conservation outcome, stubborn attachment to one's
initial interpretation, and political leanings of whatever stripe are all suspected of driving data
interpretation. See Michael S. Cooperman & Douglas F. Markle, The Endangered Species and
the National Research Council's Interim Judgment in Klamath Basin, 28(3) FISHERIES 10 (Mar.
2003) (providing one example of an exchange of polite accusations); William M. Lewis, Jr.,
Klamath Basin Fishes: Argument is No Substitute for Evidence, 28(3) FISHERIES 20 (Mar. 2003).
Recognizing their own conservation bent and the effect that bias can have both on data
interpretation and on the perception of proffered scientific advice, conservation biologists have
long exhorted their fellows to put the classical scientific method front and center. See, e.g.,
Dennis D. Murphy, Conservation Biology and Scientific Method, 4 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY
203 (1990). In fact, there is no strong line between "real science" and "advocacy science."
Interpretations of uncertain data are always affected to some degree by the scientific, political,
and other views of the interpreter.
191. Cf U.S. EPA SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, supra note 54, at 2 (calling for EPA to




discoveries. It is worth making the effort to diagnose problems because there may be
practical steps that can be taken to bridge, or at least narrow, information gaps.
A number of such steps could be helpful across a variety of contexts. It is sobering
to note, though, that even in the oil industry, with billions of dollars at stake, basic
repairs and maintenance can be ignored. 192 For natural resource management, where
government agencies are always financially strapped and the absence of information
often favors private economic interests, no one should be under the illusion that it will
be easy to institute a more effective maintenance regime for the information pipeline.
A. Recognize the Limits of Scientific Information
The first step in improving the use of scientific information in natural resource
decisions is for scientists, managers, and the interested public to recognize the limits of
what scientific information can contribute to those decisions. That sounds simple, but it
apparently is not. Although commentators have long recognized that science cannot be
the only input to resource management, unrealistic expectations of science continue to
plague resource conflicts.
Many resource questions are fundamentally questions of values not susceptible to
scientific resolution. Questions of "how much is enough" to conserve, often the most
challenging issues for managers, fall in this category. Science can, at least in theory,
identify minimum viable populations, the threshold that must be protected if a species
is to survive. But above that threshold, science cannot tell society, for example, how
many gray wolves, occupying how much of their historic range, are enough, 93 or what
balance should be struck between habitat preservation and development. Questions of
what should be conserved also fall into this category. Science can highlight distinctions
between hatchery and wild-born salmon,' 94 or between populations of killer whales,'
95
but cannot answer which should be preserved or at what cost.
192. After BP shut down its Prudhoe Bay operations in August 2006 due to severe corrosion
in pipelines, company officials said that they had spot checked pipelines but had not run a
"smart pig" through to examine the entire length of the lines since 1992. Complete inspections
had not been done even after a series of tests ordered by government officials revealed corrosion
at a number of points. Clifford Krauss & Jeremy W. Peters, Biggest Oil Field in U.S. Is Forced
to Stop Pumping, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 8, 2006, at Al.
193. Whether the gray wolf should be delisted has been controversial because although
populations are increasing in the Northern Rockies and Great Lakes areas, the vast majority of
the wolf's historic range in the contiguous United States remains unoccupied. See, e.g.,
Defenders of Wildlife v. Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1156 (D. Or. 2005)
(overturning rule downlisting gray wolf to threatened over most of its historic range). Since that
decision, FWS has delisted the wolf in its two strongholds, the Western Great Lakes and
Northern Rockies. Final Rule Designating the Western Great Lakes Populations of Gray Wolves
as a Distinct Population Segment; Removing the Western Great Lakes Distinct Population
Segment of the Gray Wolf From the List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 72 Fed. Reg.
6052 (Feb. 8, 2007) (codified at 50 C.F.R. 17.11); Final Rule Designating the Northern Rocky
Mountain Population of Gray Wolf as a Distinct Population Segment and Removing This
Distinct Population Segment From the Federal List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 73
Fed. Reg. 10,514 (Feb. 27, 2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. 17.11).
194. For an independent panel report requested by NOAA Fisheries, see JODY HEY ET AL.,
CONSIDERING LIFE HISTORY, BEHAVIORAL, AND ECOLOGICAL COMPLEXITY IN DEFNtNG
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Looking to science to articulate societal values can only result in frustration and
controversy. Consider, for example, the dispute over regulatory protection of the
Preble's meadow jumping mouse (Zapus hudsonius preblei). Designated as a
subspecies in the 1950s based on skull measurements, the Preble's meadow jumping
mouse was listed as threatened in 1998.196 That listing, which potentially complicates
development in Wyoming and along the rapidly urbanizing Front Range of the Rocky
Mountains in Colorado, has brought strenuous opposition and spawned a bitter
scientific dispute. Dr. Rob Roy Ramey, a scientist at the Denver Museum of Nature
and Science, concluded on the basis of a genetic study that the Preble's mouse
belonged in the same subspecies as the abundant Bear Lodge jumping mouse of
Montana and South Dakota. 197 Ramey testified before Congress that his study, which
was financed in part by the state of Wyoming, highlighted the need to set higher
scientific standards for ESA implementation. 198 In response to a petition submitted by
Wyoming and relying heavily on Ramey's work, FWS proposed to delist the Preble's
meadow jumping mouse. 199 After getting conflicting opinions from fourteen scientists
it had asked to review Ramey's work, FWS commissioned a new genetic study by
USGS scientist Tim King. Using slightly different methods, King affirmed the earlier
taxonomy, concluding that the Preble's mouse was genetically distinct from other
subspecies. 2°° Wyoming sought a third opinion from a biologist at Brigham Young
University, who concluded that there were "differences between the Preble's and Bear
Lodge mice, but not enough to justify their description as two subspecies."20' New
studies appeared, King and Ramey traded ugly comments, 202 and FWS eventually
empanelled an expert advisory body to sort it all OUt.203 The panel determined that the
Preble's mouse was a valid subspecies under most definitions, 2°4 but of course that
was never really the fundamental question.
CONSERVATION UNITS FOR PACIFC SALMON (June 13, 2005),
http://www.nwfsc.noaa.gov/trt/regarding-salmon-esus.pdf.
195. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Lohn, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1223 (W.D. Wash. 2003).
196. Final Rule to List the Preble's Meadow Jumping Mouse as a Threatened Species, 63
Fed. Reg. 26,517 (May 13, 1998) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). The available genetic
studies at the time of listing were consistent with recognition of the subspecies. Id. at 26521.
197. Rob Roy Ramey II et al., Genetic Relatedness of the Preble's Meadow Jumping Mouse
(Zapus Hudsonius Preblei) to Nearby Subspecies of Z. Hudsonius as Inferredfrom Variation in
Cranial Morphology, Mitochondrial DNA and Microsatellite DNA: Implications for Taxonomy
and Conservation, 8 ANIMAL CONSERVATION 329 (2005).
198. Kirk Johnson, Debate Swirls Around the Status of a Protected Mouse, N.Y. TIMES, June
27, 2004, § 1, at 16.
199. Twelve-Month Finding on a Petition to Delist the Preble's Meadow Jumping Mouse
(Zapus Hudsonius Preblei) and Proposed Delisting of the Preble's Meadow Jumping Mouse, 70
Fed. Reg. 5404 (proposed Feb. 2, 2005) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
200. Tim L. King et al., Comprehensive Genetic Analyses Reveal Evolutionary Distinction of
a Mouse (Zapus Hudsonius Preblei) Proposedfor Delistingfrom the U.S. Endangered Species
Act, 15 MOLECULAR ECOLOGY 4331 (2006).
201. Peter Aldhous, The Mouse that No One Can Ignore, NEW SCIENTIST, July 15, 2006,
at 12.
202. King accused Ramey of making a systematic error. Ramey responded that, "Tim King's
station in life seems to be to do scientific colonoscopies." Jim Erickson, Biologists Pelt One
Another over Mouse, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, June 21, 2006, at A12.
203. Aldhous, supra note 201.
204. SUSTAINABLE EcOsYsTEMs INST., EVALUATION OF SCiENTIFIC INFORMATION REGARDING
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The Preble's mouse saga illustrates the difference between data and information,
and the role of nonscientific input in making that leap. The information needed to
inform the management decision to list the Preble's meadow jumping mouse or not is
whether the Preble's mouse is different from others in ways that justify its protection.
Genetic and morphometric data can highlight differences, but they don't tell decision
makers which differences matter, or how much difference is enough to justify different
conservation treatment. Putting aside the disagreements about who has the better data,
taxonomic "lumpers" and "splitters" could look at the exact same data and come to
different classification conclusions. Before managers can make effective use of data, or
even understand what types of data are relevant to their decision, they need a clearer
understanding of the conservation goals they are supposed to be pursuing.
It is also important to recognize the difficulties inherent in producing some types of
scientific data, or in producing information that is absolutely beyond doubt. As one of
several National Research Council committees tasked with examining various aspects
of Columbia River salmon management has explained:
Substantial resources have been devoted to investigating Columbia River salmon,
and today these fish species are one of the most intensively studied in the United
States, if not the world. Although scientific understanding of the salmon has
improved over the decades, perfect understanding of all factors and relationships
that affect salmon life cycles is beyond current and foreseeable future scientific
means.
More precise scientific information regarding salmon behavior, environmental
influences, and rates of survival could, over time, no doubt be obtained. However,
significant resources are now being devoted to this pursuit, as federal and state
scientists and scientists from universities and regional consultancies are involved
in extensive salmon research programs. One task pursued in this study concerned
the identification of knowledge "gaps" and "scientific information" needed to
develop comprehensive strategies for recovering and sustaining listed species and
managing water resources to meet human needs . . . This task, however,
presupposes that sound management strategies can be devised only when scientific
"gaps" are filled and that it is possible to determine a priori the scientific
information that will lead to better management decisions. Such suppositions do
not reflect contemporary natural resources management realities and the
relationships between scientific information and decision making processes.
20 5
Demanding perfection of scientific information is a recipe for paralysis by analysis.
Interests favored by the status quo might well prefer that approach, but it will rarely be
conducive to effective conservation. Managers must evaluate, to the best of their
ability, the likelihood of obtaining desired scientific information at a reasonable cost
within a reasonable time frame. Decisions about how to handle uncertainty should take
into account the reducibility or irreducibility of that uncertainty, as well as the risks
and costs of various types of error.
PREBLE'S MEADOW JUMPING MOUSE (2006), http://www.fws.gov/mountain-
prairie/species/mammals/preble/PreblesSELreport.pdf.
205. COMM. ON WATER RES. MGMT., INSTREAM FLows, AND SALMON SURVIVAL IN THE
COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, MANAGING THE COLUMBIA RIVER:




That leads to the next lesson. The most important leaks in the information supply
line should be addressed first, and efforts to gather, distribute, and use scientific
information should be tailored to the value that information has to the decisions being
made. Like oil exploration and extraction, scientific research and data gathering are
capital-intensive and risky ventures. Their high costs and uncertain benefits call for
some attempt at a crude cost-benefit evaluation. Although it was once the prevailing
practice, no oil company today could justify to its shareholders randomly poking holes
in the earth, even in the vicinity of proven reserves, or extracting resources that cannot
economically be marketed and used. Such reckless expenditures should also be
avoided in the information supply process.
Information-intensive management may itself require cost-benefit justification at the
most general level. The direct costs of reflective resource management, in which
managers try to forecast ex ante the impacts of management measures and monitor
those impacts ex post to refine their forecasting ability, are necessarily higher than
those of the current prevailing practice of pursuing an intuitive best guess without
follow-up. Proponents of the former strategy should be prepared both to articulate its
long-term benefits, which should include a higher likelihood of conservation success
and financial savings over the long run because mistakes do not have to be undone or
corrected, and to think seriously about how much of what type of information inputs
are most useful up front and how back-end evaluation can be done most efficiently.
More explicitly addressing these sorts of questions could address some of the political
barriers to increased funding, helping legislators understand the value of information
production and use in relation to that of uninformed action.
Evaluating the costs and benefits of information supply steps is not easy. As the
NRC committee quoted above pointed out, it is tough to identify in advance the types
of scientific information that will most help managers and, given the uncertainties of
exploration, generally impossible to precisely calculate the cost of improved
understanding of ecological systems. Nonetheless, rough priorities could probably be
identified at two different levels, and the process of priority setting itself could help
clarify both societal values and information shortfalls.
First, priority setting is needed at the very broadest levels, across the range of
resource management problems, for both exploratory and extractive data production. In
the United States, "[t]here is no overall mechanism to determine the most appropriate
and highest priority investments in monitoring and reporting capacity, ' 2° 6 or for that
matter in basic exploratory research. As a result, research and monitoring efforts and
funding are distributed ad hoc, primarily to the highest profile resource conflicts, with
little or no thought given to the value of different potential studies.2 °7
206. H. JOHN HEINZ 1II CTR. FOR SCI., ECON. & THE ENv'T, FILLING THE GAPS: PRIORrrY DATA
NEEDS AND KEY MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES FOR NATIONAL REPORTING ON ECOSYSTEM
CONDmON 4 (2006), http://www.heinzctr.org/Programs/Reporting/Working Groups/Data
Gaps/GapsLongReport-LoRes.pdf.
207. Spending on endangered species recovery, for example, varies widely across species.
See, e.g., FWS FED. & ST. ENDANGERED & THREATENED SPECIES ExPENDITuREs: FIsCAL YEAR
2004,6 (2006), http:l/www.fws.gov/endangered/expenditures/reportsFWS Endangered Species
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Second, priority setting and explicit analysis of the value and feasibility of
producing specific types of information are underutilized at a much narrower scale for
individual resource management problems. As a result, large amounts of money may
be spent on research and on management efforts without advancing knowledge of the
system. It is hard to imagine a situation more likely to produce resentment of
conservation efforts and political incursions into conservation budgets. Management of
Columbia River salmon resources is probably the highest profile example of large
expenditures without substantial advances in understanding. Direct federal
expenditures for recovery of Columbia River salmon stocks were over $3 billion
dollars between 1982 and 2002,208 yet the threats to those stocks remain poorly
understood. Perhaps, as the excerpt above from the most recent NRC Columbia salmon
report suggests, much of our remaining ignorance is due to the intractable nature of the
scientific questions posed by salmon management. But surely not all of it-recall the
failure to systematically study juvenile salmon barging, one of the major strategies
relied upon by river managers to protect the fish. 209 Other examples of substantial
expenditures without documented learning are not hard to find.
Explicit analysis of priorities and the value of information would likely encourage
two steps that are currently frequently skipped: formal decision analysis and post-
implementation monitoring. The first is not costly, but tends to be omitted in the rush
to implement those actions managers assume will be most beneficial. The second
carries costs, but without it learning is nearly impossible. To cite just one example
where skipping these two steps has kept learning at a virtual standstill, a 2002 GAO
report found that after twenty-five years of research and management efforts to recover
the Mojave Desert tortoise, at a cost of more than $100 million, almost nothing was
known about the status of the species, threats to its survival, or the effectiveness of
management actions taken on its behalf.210 The primary culprits, according to the
GAO, were lack of a considered research strategy and failure to monitor the effects of
management steps. The first would highlight what is and is not known about the
resource, and what knowledge has the greatest potential to influence management
choices. It would also encourage the development of formal, even if simplistic, models
2004 Expenditures Report.pdf; J. Michael Scott, Leona K. Svancara & Anna Pidgorna, By the
Numbers, in DALE D. GOBLE, J. MICHAEL Sco'rr & FRANK W. DAVIS, EDS., THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY: RENEWING THE CONSERVATION PROMISE 16 (2005). There is no overall
planning process for determining expenditures. The differences do not disappear when
expenditures are compared to the total costs of recovery estimated in recovery plans, and they
do appear to correlate with species' status. Julie K. Miller, J. Michael Scott, Craig R. Miller &
Lisette P. Watts, The Endangered Species Act: Dollars and Sense?, 52 BIOScENCEE 163 (2002).
208. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN SALMON AND STEELHEAD:
FEDERAL AGENCIES' RECOVER RESPONSIBILITIES, EXPENDITURES AND ACTIONS 2 (2002).
209. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62. See also Mary H. Ruckelshaus, Phil Levin,
Jerald B. Johnson & Peter M. Kareiva, The Pacific Salmon Wars: What Science Brings to the
Challenge of Recovering Species, 33 ANN. REV. OF ECOLOGY & SYSTEMATICS 665,685 (2002)
("The contents of salmon management plans thus appear to be guided by serendipitous
treatment of these effects by scientists, rather than a more holistic biological vision of threats
analysis."); id. at 690 ("Clearly, a widely agreed upon and supported strategic research plan is
needed to organize guidance for salmon recovery efforts.").
210. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES: RESEARCH STRATEGY AND




of the managed system, which facilitate oversight by increasing the transparency of
211
management judgments.
Priority setting appears to work best when it engages outside experts, and when
there is a mechanism for overseeing its implementation. Without a mechanism for
oversight, priority setting for research, just as for other management decisions, can
easily become an empty exercise. For example, a priority-setting process was
developed by Forest Service researchers for decisions about what to survey and
monitor in connection with actions proposed under the Northwest Forest Plan.212 The
researchers recognized that although the plan called for forest management to protect
several hundred species, not every one could be actively managed, nor could the
impacts of every proposed action on each be evaluated. They called for the setting of
priorities, taking into account the extent of known or suspected risk to the species, its
potential impact on management actions, and the ability to collect information
efficiently and effectively.21 3 Those sound like reasonable factors to consider.
However, it is not possible to evaluate how well this strategy has worked, or even if it
has been implemented at all. No readily accessible database recounts the use of this
strategy or its consequences. Indeed, not long after it was issued, the Bush
administration decided to substantially cut back on the "survey and manage"
strategy.21 4 As managers struggle to make the transition from nearly blind to reflective
management, it is important that management strategies themselves be subjected to
ongoing monitoring and especially to post-hoc evaluation, so that those that work best
and most efficiently can be identified and replicated.
NMFS has also made some efforts toward priority setting, although so far those
attempts appear half-hearted. In 1996, Congress ordered the Service to develop a
strategic plan for fisheries research, to be revised every three years. 21 5 An initial
strategic plan was published in 1998, and updated in 2001 and 2004. 216 The 2001 plan
211. See Shaffer et al., supra note 5, at 135. Explicit modeling, even at a very basic level,
can also decrease the extent to which the judgments of scientific advisors or managers respond
to their unconscious biases rather than to what is actually known about the system. Michael A.
McCarthy, David Keith, Justine Tietjen, Mark A. Burgman, Mark Maunder, Larry Master,
Barry W. Brook, Georgina Mace, Hugh P. Possingham, Rodrigo Medellin, Sandy Andelman,
Helen Regan, Tracey Regan & Mary Ruckelshaus, Comparing Predictions of Extinction Risk
Using Models and Subjective Judgment, 26 AcTA OECOLOGICA 67 (2004).
212. See RANDY MOLINA, DAN McKENZIE, ROBIN LESHER, JAN FORD, JIM ALEGRIA &
RICHARD CUTLER, USDA FOREST SERV., GENERAL TECHNICAL REPORT PNW-GTR-573,
STRATEGIC SURVEY FRAMEWORK FOR THE NORTHWEST FOREST PLAN SURVEY AND MANAGE
PROGRAM (2003).
213. See id. at 4-5 (referring to these as biological, managerial, and operational factors, and
breaking them down into a number of more specific subfactors).
214. See Doremus, supra note 10, at 294-96. That move has recently been scuttled by a
federal court. Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. Rey, No. 04-844P, 2006 WL 44361 (W.D. Wash., Jan.
9,2006) (setting aside the 2004 Record of Decision and reinstating the 2001 Record of Decision
and its survey and manage requirements); Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. Rey, No. 04-844P, 2006
WL 1075213 (W.D. Wash., Apr. 20, 2006) (declining to reconsider the January decision).
215. 16 U.S.C. § 1881c(b) (2000).
216. NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NMFS STRATEGIC PLAN FOR
FISHERIES RESEARCH 10 (3d ed. 2004), http://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/st4/s.plan2004/NMFS-
Strat-Plan-2004.pdf.
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contains a lengthy laundry list of general studies NMFS intends to engage in, without
any attempt to set priorities, evaluate management usefulness, or assess resource
217demands. Its scope was limited to NMFS's own research facilities; it made no
attempt to assess the availability or usefulness of independent academic, state, or other
research efforts. It appears to have had little impact on management-relevant research
needs, even within the agency that produced it. In 2004, a group of NMFS scientists
published a paper calling for a coordinated research plan on the estuarine and marine
phases of the Pacific salmon lifecycle. They noted that although several NMFS
laboratories were involved in such research, there was no coordinated plan for
organizing those activities, or for developing "mutually beneficial and synergistic
research programs with universities, state agencies, and other government
laboratories. 2 8
A better model for priority setting comes from the California Bay-Delta Authority
and emphasizes the importance of outside review of agency research priorities. The
Bay-Delta Authority is the institutional successor of the short-lived state-federal Cal-
Fed program.2 19 While it has had its problems with funding and political acceptance,
this program has made very strong efforts to systematize the development of new
scientific information about the Bay-Delta and to incorporate that information into
management decisions. From the outset, Cal-Fed included a science program as one of
its core program elements. 220 An Independent Science Board and other independent
review panels were also part of the original Cal-Fed structure.22' In a very practical
way, the creation of a single science program has facilitated effective priority setting:
funding for Bay-Delta research and ecosystem restoration grants that had been
scattered among a variety of agencies was suddenly both centralized and subject to
independent review. 222 In addition, the Independent Science Board has been a
persistent force, urging the consideration of multiple disciplinary perspectives,
recommending priorities for research, harping on the importance of monitoring, and
pointing out problems with funding processes.223
Publicity about the lack of good science supporting expensive programs can also
help push agencies toward real priority setting. Just a few years ago, the federal desert
tortoise conservation program was in such disarray that it generated a GAO report
217. See NAT'LMARINE FISHERIES SERv., U.S. DEP'TOFCOMMERCE, NMFS STRATEGIC PLAN
FOR FISHERIES RESEARCH (2d ed. 2001), available at http://www.govdocs.aquake.org/
cgi/reprint/2003/516/5160010.pdf.
218. Richard D. Brodeur, George W. Boehlert, Ed Casillas, Maxwell B. Eldridge, John H.
Helle, William T. Peterson, William R. Heard, Steven T. Lindley & Michael H. Schiewe, A
Coordinated Research Plan for Estuarine and Ocean Research on Pacific Salmon, FISHERIES,
May 2000, at 7, available at http://www.nwfsc.noaa.gov/assets/2/
3287_06172004_104126_salmonplan.pdf.
219. For a description of Cal-Fed's origin and structure, see Jody Freeman & Daniel A.
Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DuKE L.J. 795, 837-57 (2005).
220. CALFED BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, PROGRAMMATIC RECORD OF DECISION 74 (2000).
221. Id. at 75.
222. Freeman & Farber, supra note 219, at 865.
223. See, e.g., Memorandum from Tom Dunne, Chair & Denise Reed, Vice Chair to Cal.





highly critical of the lack of a coordinated research agenda. 224 Reacting to that report,
the Fish and Wildlife Service created a dedicated Desert Tortoise Recovery Office and
empanelled an advisory committee of outside experts. The goals of the new office, in
consultation with the advisory committee, included prioritizing and coordinating
research activities, as well as evaluating the resulting data.
225
Priority setting is one of the points at which engaging outside experts can be most
valuable. There has been considerable discussion in recent years of the role of peer
review in administrative decision making, with much of that discussion centered on
individual environmental and natural resource decisions. 226 Under the authority of the
Information Quality Act, the Office of Management and Budget has directed all federal
agencies to have important scientific information peer reviewed before disseminating
it.227 As Dan Tarlock and I have explained elsewhere, peer review of individual
management decisions by individual reviewers employing a journal-style model is
unlikely to provide much additional constraint on agency judgments already bounded
by professional norms and the threat of judicial review. 228 Review of entire
management programs by a standing committee, an ad hoc committee with the
visibility of the National Research Council, or a less high-profile committee with the
ability to publicize its views is a very different matter. On an expost basis, that kind of
review can significantly increase the transparency of agency judgments by forcing
public explanation of the rationale behind those judgments. It can also spur learning, in
part by bringing the latest research developments to the attention of agency scientists
too busy to closely follow the evolving literature. But review is likely to be most useful
in proactively helping to set research agendas, both because that can help avoid costly
mistakes before they are made and because agencies are less likely to react defensively
to input targeted to helping them make better future decisions than to criticism of past
actions.
It can be difficult to recruit top scientists to serve on these sorts of review
committees, which are time consuming and can embroil the participants in unwanted
controversy. Some will volunteer out of a sense of obligation to make socially valuable
use of their training, or because they care deeply about the success of the programs in
question. Paying them for their time can help, as can the prestige of the sponsoring
institution. Many scientists look at an invitation to serve on an NRC committee as a
sign of professional validation, and their universities are likely to share that view. That
may be a good reason for maximizing the NRC's role in program review. Reviewers
could be encouraged to adapt their reviews for publication in the scientific literature,
and prestigious journals could commit to creating suitable fora for these sorts of
papers. Other sorts of rewards could be envisioned, such as prizes from professional
societies for distinguished public service.
224. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 210.
225. Desert Tortoise Recovery Office, http://www.fws.gov/nevadaldeserttortoise.
226. See J.B. Ruh], Prescribing the Right Dose of Peer Review for the Endangered Species
Act, 83 NEB. L. REv. 398 (2004) (providing thoughtful discussion of the appropriate role of peer
review in natural resource management); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REVIEW PROCEDURES FOR
WATER RESOURCES PROJECT PLANNING (2002).
227. Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 Fed. Reg. 2664 (Jan. 14,2005).
228. Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 123, at 32.
2008]
INDIANA LAWJOURNAL
C. Encourage Management-Relevant Exploration
Many natural resource conflicts are plagued by limited knowledge of the basic
functioning of the systems being managed. In part, this is certainly due to the
difficulties of studying these systems and of sorting out the complexities of their
processes. But there is more to it than that. There seems to be a systematic disconnect
between the worlds of the exploratory researcher and of the natural resource manager.
This cultural gap, which leads to information gaps, can be narrowed from both sides.
On the research side, we need stronger incentives for untethered, creative
exploratory work on natural systems. One piece of that should be greater funding for
ecological and environmental science, primarily in university settings. In fiscal year
2003, the federal government devoted just over $200 million to grants supporting
university-based research in "environmental biology." 229 Given the billions of dollars
and irreplaceable noneconomic interests at stake in resource conflicts, that investment
should be substantially increased.
But simply throwing money at academic researchers will not guarantee success,
especially if the researchers themselves are put in charge of distribution. Funding is
only one factor in determining the questions researchers choose to tackle. Training and
professional acculturation are also important. Scientists pursue questions their training
equips them to perceive and answer. The quest for career advancement and prestige
drives them toward the techniques and problems with the highest perceived status. In
ecology and related fields, those are not the questions of most interest to managers.
Academics have focused on producing complex mathematical models rather than on
generating the basic life history information needed to drive those models. Paul Dayton
sees a stark and depressing mismatch in priorities: "academics have fiddled while the
natural world they argue about has burned., 230 Dayton explains that natural history and
taxonomy are essential to understanding the declines of species and ecosystems, but
charges that "scientific elitism" has eroded the importance of those fields to the point
that the foundation needed to address conservation problems is missing. 231 As part of
the broad priority-setting exercise advocated above, new investments in environmental
research should target fields important to management efforts but underrepresented
among new graduates. That can be done through targeted graduate and post-doctoral
fellowships, as long as enough qualified mentors are available. It is' important to revive
the "ologies" before the last generation of practitioners disappears from university
halls, lest we face the need to entirely reinvent these fields.232
229. See supra text accompanying note 51.
230. Paul K. Dayton, The Importance of the Natural Sciences to Conservation, 162 AM.
NATURALIST 1, 2 (2003); see also Paul K. Dayton & Enric Sala, Natural History: The Sense of
Wonder, Creativity, and Progress in Ecology, 65 (Supp. 2) SCIENTIA MARINA 199 (2001)
(decrying the "demise of natural history," which the authors view as the essential foundation for
creativity in ecological research).
231. Dayton, supra note 230, at 10-11. Vicky Meretsky echoed those concerns at this
conference, pointing to a shortage of people learning the "ologies," the basic natural-history-
oriented biology fields. Teresa Woods pointed out one consequence of that shortfall, that
analytical tools outpace collection of data to analyze.
232. Dayton suggests that an entire generation of biologists has already grown up without
the necessary background in natural history, so that some bootstrapping may already be needed
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It is also important to emphasize at the level of graduate training, where much
professional acculturation occurs, the value of problem solving and of real-world
engagement. This is one place where there is cause for optimism. Although academic
incentives are often described as strongly resistant to change, in fact academic fads
come and go with surprising rapidity. The demand for graduate training in particular
sub-fields, and the capacity to provide that training, can respond quickly to changes in
the employment market. Investment in a few dozen faculty positions at major research
universities tied to contributions to the resolution of real-life resource management
problems would go a long way toward encouraging students to pursue that type of
science. In fact, it looks to me like students going into conservation-oriented fields
these days do not need much prodding in that direction; all they need are opportunities
and the endorsement of their mentors or key players in the field. At my own university,
the ecology graduate students are already pushing the faculty toward giving more
respect to problem solving rather than just high theory, and demanding that their
education include, or at least provide room for, experience with policy-relevant issues.
At the same time, university administrators faced with tight budgets and dwindling
public funding commitments are paying more than lip service to the notion that higher
education must prove its value to society by bringing knowledge to bear on the most
pressing societal problems. 233 University scientists who went into conservation-related
fields because they care about the natural world have founded new disciplines,
launched new journals, and created new professional societies to help bring academic
prestige to problem-oriented work.234 Although they still provide only a small
proportion of total research funding, nonprofit, problem-oriented funding sources
increasingly allow practitioners of management-relevant research to support their work
while meeting traditional measures of academic professional success. 235 Even the most
prestigious general-interest scientific journals have begun to respond, publishing high-
quality problem-oriented work, thereby giving that work instant academic
respectability. Studies that are "surprising" from a management perspective are more
likely than work confirming management assumptions to result in high-profile
publications, providing research scientists with an added incentive to probe those
assumptions. 236
to revive these fields. Id. at 11-12.
233. In a 1998 convocation address, for example, the Chancellor of UC Davis emphasized
"the fully engaged university-the university's continuing obligation to full engagement in
addressing societal problems." Larry Vanderhoef, Chancellor, UC Davis, Convocation Speech
at UC Davis, http://chancellor.ucdavis.edu/Resource/commun/1998/convoc98.cfm. Since then,
"the fully engaged university" has been a watchword throughout the UC system.
234. The most obvious example is the field of conservation biology, which was launched as
an explicitly "mission-oriented" field and now has a professional society and several dedicated
peer-reviewed journals.
235. Examples include the Packard Foundation, Resources Legacy Fund, Evan Frankel
Foundation, and Switzer Foundation, among others.
236. As just one example, the Independent Scientific Group on Cattle TB convened by Great
Britain's Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs published two papers on studies
demonstrating that badger culling can actually increase bovine TB. Donnelly et al., supra note
67, at 843; Donnelly et al., supra note 64, at 834. Closer to home, the National Center for
Ecological Analysis and Synthesis (NCEAS) in Santa Barbara has supported several workshops
closely tied to resource management problems that have produced peer-reviewed publications.
For example, one produced a major study of recovery plans under the ESA that became a
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Help in closing this gap can also come from the agency side. Management agencies
should not directly control decisions about what exploratory work is done, because it is
too likely that those decisions would be strongly skewed by agency culture and
mission. 237 But agencies do need to build stronger links with free-wheeling research
scientists and the academic research culture, which is far more tolerant of mistakes
(which can often be "productive" in the sense of advancing knowledge) and strong
directional shifts, and at the same time far more demanding that scientists constantly
defend their intuitions, interpretations, and research choices. Researchers also need
stronger links to management institutions to help keep them aware of the kinds of
challenges managers face and the information they might be able to use. These links
can be encouraged by, for example, making student fellowships available for work
linked directly or indirectly to management decisions, by offering funding for students
to work with agency personnel or for agency personnel to spend "sabbaticals" at
238research institutions, or even just by creating nonthreatening opportunities for
researchers and managers with common interests to meet and exchange experiences,
concerns, and frustrations.
Management agencies can also act to lower bureaucratic hurdles, which can pose
significant practical barriers to independent research. Research scientists are not
known for their patience with bureaucratic procedures and paperwork, especially if
those things create delays, require approval by functionaries who do not (from the
researcher's perspective) fully understand the project, and (again, to the researcher's
eye) serve no useful function. I am told, for example, that controlled experiments
testing the impact of forest fires on water quality could be, but are not, being done on
national forest lands in part because of the frustrations potential researchers have
experienced with the NEPA compliance process.239
With a little creative thinking, agencies can ease these sorts of burdens without
threatening the resources for which they are ultimately responsible. Agencies could,
for example, assign staffers who are familiar with NEPA and ESA processes to
special issue of the journal Ecological Applications. Peter M. Kareiva, Applying Ecological
Science to Recovery Planning, 12 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 629 (2002) (introduction to the
special issue). On its web site, NCEAS claims to have produced over 1000 publications, many
in leading journals. Evidence of the Impact of NCEAS, http://www.nceas.ucsb.edu/statistics.
237. For evidence of that kind of skewing, one need look no further than the history of
Forest Service research stations. See Rigg, supra note 6, at 86 ("In past decades, USFS research
focused on the growth rate, yield, and genetic resistance of individual species, reflecting an
organizational culture based on traditional resource management values.").
238. The University of California and the California Resources Agency launched an
innovative fellowship program in 1995 designed to bring agency personnel into the university
for a year or less and vice versa. University of California-Davis, Public Service Research
Program, State and Regional Agency Partnerships and Collaborations, http://psrp.ucdavis.edu/.
It has proven easier to attract agency personnel to academia than the other way around, but
providing additional rewards for academic problem solving, and offering roles in the thick of
interesting problems, could potentially correct that imbalance.
239. After spending a year working with the staff at one national forest to set up a controlled
study of the impacts of fire on forest ecosystems and faced with the possibility that an
environmental assessment could take another two years or more, one UC Berkeley professor
moved his study to a University of California research forest, where exhaustive environmental
analysis was not required. E-mail from Scott Stephens, Assistant Professor of Fire Science, UC
Berkeley (Aug. 15, 2006) (on file Indiana Law Journal).
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shepherd high-priority research proposals through the bureaucratic maze. Ramping up
the level of resource commitment a bit, management agencies could designate specific
geographic areas for wide-ranging exploratory studies. They could carry out any
required enviromnental assessments at the time of designation, or on a "worst case"
basis if it is not possible to predict what sorts of studies might be carried out, rather
than waiting until they receive research proposals.
A somewhat more systematic version of the Forest Service's existing network of
experimental forests could greatly enhance the opportunity for resource management
experimentation. Designation of experimental forests began in 1908; today there are 77
experimental forests scattered around the country, including the famous Hubbard
Brook National Forest, site of the experiments that first convincingly revealed the
effects of acid precipitation. 2 40 Although the system has grown in a fairly ad hoc
manner, it contains representatives of twenty-one of the twenty-five forest cover types
in the United States and covers a broad range of environmental conditions.241 Many
units host long-term studies with important management implications.242 Work at the
experimental forests is not, however, well networked, nor have the individual sites
been selected for importance to current and future management issues.
Should a priority-setting exercise be undertaken as recommended above, 243one of
its tasks could be to identify other sites that might be added to the experimental forest
system. Another could be to outline a strategic research plan integrated across the sites.
An integrated research network could reduce bureaucratic barriers by, among other
things, giving managers the confidence to sanction risky but potentially promising
management experiments. Experimental locations should be chosen for their potential
value to management decisions, but that does not mean they must necessarily be in the
core habitat of protected species, where experiments might present greatest
conservation concern. For species with a wide range, secure protection in one location
might allow another location to be used freely for controlled experimentation, even if
that means possible extirpation from parts of the experimental area. At least some
types of experiments can be monitored, and treatments that show a strong adverse
effect on resources of concern can be terminated early, as they are in human drug
trials.244 Furthermore, if researchers are thinking creatively, they may be able to reason
240. Ariel E. Lugo, Frederick J. Swanson, Olga Ramos Gonzalez, Mary Beth Adams, Brian
Palik, Ronald E. Thill, Dale G. Brockway, Christel Kern, Richard Woodsmith & Robert
Musselman, Long Term Research at the USDA Forest Service 's Experimental Forests and
Ranges, 56 BIOScIENCE 39 (2006).
241. Id. at 43-44.
242. Id. at 45-46.
243. See supra Part H.B.
244. See Fischman & Meretsky, supra note 6, at 94 (noting that experiments might have to
be ended early if they might jeopardize a listed species). There is apparently no clear formula
for when drug trials must be halted due to adverse effects, but certainly if patients die
unexpectedly or of unexpected causes a red flag is raised for researchers. See Matthew C.
Lovell, Second Thoughts: Do the FDA's Responses to a Fatal Drug Trial and the AIDSActivist
Community's Doubts About Early Access to Drugs Hint at a Shift in Basic FDA Policy?, 51
FOOD & DRUG L. J. 273 (1996) (explaining the drug trial process and recounting an instance of
fatal liver complications during trial of a hepatitis drug). Naturally, there is always room for
argument about the degree of acceptable risk in a research trial, as well as about the extent to
which potential negative consequences should be foreseen or detected early.
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by analogy, extrapolating from observed effects on suitable but unoccupied habitat, or
on similar but not endangered species.
Finally, learning could become a performance measure for managers. Too often,
performance in management agencies is measured simply by "bean counting," keeping
track of the number of management actions or the amount of money spent on
management. That sends precisely the wrong message to managers, encouraging them
to act without either reflection before the fact or evaluation after. Evaluating managers
on the extent to which they produce new knowledge about the system would provide
career incentives for learning. Measuring learning, however, is a tricky proposition.
245
It will not always be reflected in measurable improvement in the resource in the short
run; indeed, tying performance evaluations too closely to resource status can
discourage experimental approaches. Management learning might be usefully
evaluated through the kinds of performance screens applied in academic science-by
publication in the peer-reviewed literature, or if that seems too slow and labor-
intensive, by outside scientific review of written or oral explanations of what is known
about the system and how gaps are being addressed. 246 Even simply setting into place
periodic exercises in active reflection and evaluation by, for example, requiring regular
written reports on how the knowledge base has (or has not) changed can facilitate
learning.
247
D. Make Sure Extraction Keeps Pace
No matter how productive exploration is, if the data it makes available are not
extracted it can never play a role in management decisions. It's not surprising, given
the ease of cataloging extraction shortfalls, 248 that scientists and managers alike
express frustration at the failure of fundamental data production to keep up with
theoretical advances. In 1994, Mark Shaffer and colleagues complained that, twenty
years after population viability analysis was developed, lots of sophisticated computer
modeling had been done, but the models were of limited usefulness because little of
the field data needed to ground-truth and drive them had been produced. 249 The
situation does not seem to have improved much in the intervening decade. Resource
245. Stankey et al., supra note 56, at 46 cite the need to make learning a management
"performance element" in order to encourage adaptive management, but do not elaborate on
how that might be done.
246. The Cal-Fed Bay Delta science program in its first iteration emphasized peer review by
standing advisory committees, which seems well-suited to this kind of function. It is difficult,
however, to persuade reviewers to commit the kind of time and effort needed for an engaged,
long-term review process. Where the management effort is sufficiently important or high
profile, that alone may have considerable motivating power. Cal-Fed provided generous
consulting payments to its outside reviewers, which may not only encourage agreement to
participate but "guilt" committee members into robust engagement. Encouraging reviewers to
get involved in ways that facilitate publication and joint thinking beyond the narrow specifics of
the management measures evaluated might provide additional intellectual incentives.
247. loan Fazey, John A. Fazey & Della M. A. Fazey, Learning More Effectively from
Experience, 10(2) ECOLOGY & Soc'Y 4 (2005) available at http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/
vol10/iss2/art4.
248. For a very partial list, see supra text accompanying notes 95 to 105.
249. Shaffer et al., supra note 5, at 130.
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managers participating in this conference noted that they have plenty of data analysis
tools, but not enough data to analyze.25 °
As explained above, there may be reason for optimism that evolving academic
incentives will help address this shortfall. 25 Nonetheless, more directly targeted steps
should be taken to address the extraction shortfall. Leadership from the political and
nongovernmental arenas will be essential.
Targeted funding, free from annual appropriations struggles, ought to be provided
both for general indicator tracking and for specific high-priority extraction efforts.
Investment in development and regular monitoring of a broad range of indicators may
produce some short-term results relevant to specific management situations, but its
greater value is likely to be in inspiring novel exploratory studies and highlighting
impending resource conflicts over the longer term.
The government should finance much of the big-picture monitoring and extraction,
as well as the lion's share of exploration. It is common for government to subsidize the
research and development costs of private industry when the research is costly and
carries a high risk of failure and the industry is seen as important to societal
interests.252 The case for subsidizing the supply of information to natural resource
managers is even stronger. Private actors will not voluntarily assume the costs of
information supply to a process that ultimately is more likely to limit than to enhance
profits. It can be argued that extractive interests should internalize the costs of assuring
that their actions are consistent with societal conservation goals, but exploratory
research and generalized environmental monitoring efforts typically do not enable any
particular extractive activities. 53 Later in the process, when identified private resource
users are involved, it will generally be appropriate for those users to share in the costs
of information production, although it may still be desirable for government or
university scientists to actually do the work.
250. See also Jordan S. Rosenfeld & Todd Hatfield, Information Needs for Assessing
Critical Habitat of Freshwater Fish, 63 CANADIAN J. FISHERIES & AQUATIC SCI. 683,686 (2006)
("sufficient information to perform a PVA is often lacking for listed species, usually because
time and resources have not been available to obtain the necessary demographic parameters").
251. See supra text accompanying notes 232 to 236.
252. The oil industry, of course, has benefited from a range of government subsidies since its
inception. See Mona Hymel, The United States'Experience with Energy-Based Tax Incentives:
The Evidence Supporting Tax Incentives for Renewable Energy, 38 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 43, 46-53
(2006) (documenting range of tax incentives offered to the oil industry); Roberta F. Mann, On
the RoadAgain: How Tax Policy Drives Transportation Choice, 24 VA. TAx REv. 587,651-653
(2005) (noting ongoing tax subsidies in various forms). More generally, since 1981 a federal tax
credit has been in place for a portion of the research expenses of any business. 26 U.S.C. § 41.
The total subsidy from the research tax credit was reportedly more than $24 billion by 1994,
with over $4 billion of that going to the pharmaceutical industry alone. NATIONAL SCIENCE
BOARD, SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS-1996, at 4-20 to 4-21 (1996).
253. Professor John Applegate argues that government, rather than industry, should play the
primary role in filling data gaps "when there is structural or systematic market failure, when
government is in a position to generate the information, and when industry's credibility gap is
particularly acute." Applegate, supra note 3, at 269. All of these factors point toward
government funding in the typical natural resource management context.
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While government funding is appropriate it is also, as the discussion above
demonstrated,2 extraordinarily difficult to obtain. Strong political leadership might
help, but even that will not be enough if it comes from only one side of the aisle, as
Bruce Babbitt learned when he created the National Biological Survey. Bipartisan
agreements on the value of information, however, can shake loose funding, at least
temporarily. The dedication of a substantial portion of Cal-Fed's initial funding to a
highly independent science program is one hopeful example.
If the government cannot or will not fund extraction, the conservation community
can, and to some extent already does, help take up the slack. Scientists throughout the
world provide data on the status of species to the International Union for the
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), which periodically compiles
those data to produce its Red List, the standard resource on global biodiversity
threats. 255 The use of nonspecialist volunteers to perform certain types of data
gathering can also reduce the costs of extraction, while producing information that is
both useful and reliable. In the United States, for example, National Audubon Society
chapters across the country coordinate a Christmas Bird Count. Begun in 1900 by
twenty-seven birders in twenty-five locations, mostly in New England and the mid-
Atlantic, the Christmas Bird Count has grown to encompass nearly 2000 sites and
more than 50000 participants. With no cost for the data collection itself, the Count
provides valuable information about changes in the distribution of North American
bird populations over time and space. 256 More recently, Audubon has initiated other
"citizen science" programs, including a nationwide backyard bird count and a web site
that allows birders to contribute other sightings to an online database.
257
Government efforts would be enhanced by the creation of an agency or office
whose mission explicitly included prioritizing, carrying out, and overseeing
information extraction. That institution should be instructed to take a big-picture view,
prioritizing extraction needs, and to commit to target dates for implementing specified
measures. 25 8 The National Biological Survey (NBS) might have served this purpose,
but of course it was derailed by political opposition. Today, the USGS, or its
Biological Resources Division, are the most obvious candidates for this role. It is
unlikely that the political landscape has changed so much since the NBS debacle that it
would be easy to get Congress to endorse the concept of a natural resources
information agency, especially one explicitly serving management needs. But perhaps
it could be more effectively sold by pointing out that better information can sometimes
255. See supra text accompanying notes 94-112.
256. IUCN, Species Survival Commission, 2006 IUCN RED LIST OF THREATENED SPECIES,
available at http://www.iucnredlist.org/.
257. National Audubon Society, Christmas Bird Count, History and Objectives,
http://www.audubon.org/bird/cbc/history.html.
258. National Audubon Society, Citizen Science, http://www.audubon.org/bird/citizen/
index.html.
259. The USGS BRD strategic plan includes an impressive list of data extraction efforts, but
it does not show evidence of big-picture evaluation, nor does it include target dates. Paul V.
Dresler, Daniel L. James, Paul H. Geissler, Timothy M. Bartish & James Coyle, Strategic Plan
for the U.S. Geological Survey Status and Trends of Biological Resources Program: 2004-2009,
Circular 1277 (2004), http://biology.usgs.gov/status-trends/Ststrategicplan.pdf. It is impossible
to determine from the agency's web site to what extent the plan has been implemented.
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release, rather than add, management inhibitions. In any case, it can't hurt to publicly
point out the inconsistency of demanding "sound science" for resource management
while at the same time refusing to invest in that science.
Finally, although many others have said it before, it bears repeating: in order to
create incentives that favor information extraction we must avoid rewarding
ignorance. 25 9 To the extent that information extraction requires access to private lands,
it is essential that landowners who fail to provide access find it more difficult, rather
than easier, to develop. 26° Even when government agencies have full access to the
resource, political pressures are likely to inhibit extraction if lack of knowledge means
economic activity can proceed unhindered.
E. Break Down Disciplinary and Institutional Barriers
One of the biggest barriers to both the production and the use of information is the
landscape of isolated disciplinary and institutional silos confining researchers and
managers.
On the research side, those trained in established disciplines tend to see
management problems through their peculiar disciplinary lenses and to push as
universal solutions whatever maximizes the importance of their discipline. 26' As with
exploration and extraction, there are some hopeful signs of change in academia with
respect to the importance of disciplinary boxes. Universities are increasingly
acknowledging the importance of interdisciplinary approaches, especially to
environmental problems, and establishing interdisciplinary centers and programs.262
Government funding institutions are rewarding, or even requiring, grant proposals
encompassing multiple participants from diverse disciplines.
263
Still, much more remains to be done. Many observers consider the current emphasis
on multidisciplinary training and research in universities and funding agencies to be
superficial. It is widely believed that academic incentives still favor disciplinary depth
260. See Wagner, supra note 18.
261. Polasky & Doremus, supra note 90.
261. See supra text accompanying notes 120-21.
262. Recently established multi-disciplinary academic institutions include the Nicholas
School of the Environment and Earth Sciences at Duke University and the Donald Bren School
of Environmental Science and Management at the University of California, Santa Barbara.
263. One example is the National Science Foundation's Integrative Graduate Education
Research and Training grant program which, according to NSF "has been developed to meet the
challenges of educating U.S. Ph.D. scientists and engineers . . . with the interdisciplinary
backgrounds, deep knowledge in chosen disciplines, and technical, professional, and personal
skills to become, in their own careers, leaders and creative agents for change. The program is
intended to catalyze a cultural change in graduate education, for students, faculty, and
institutions, by establishing innovative new models for graduate education and training in a
fertile environment for collaborative research that transcends traditional disciplinary boundaries.
It is also intended to facilitate diversity in student participation and preparation, and to
contribute to the development of a diverse, globally-engaged, science and engineering
workforce." National Science Foundation, Integrative Graduate Education and Research




over interdisciplinary breadth. 264 Those two, of course, need not be in tension.
Excellent disciplinarians could be encouraged to work with similarly excellent
practitioners of other disciplines, rather than being told that they alone must master all
the disciplines relevant to the environmental problems that most interest them. This
process must begin at the graduate student level, if not before. Simply exposing
students to the perspectives, importance, and complexities introduced by other
disciplines can go a long way toward breaking them free of their silos. 265 Not all
graduate students should be expected to do interdisciplinary work; there is still
considerable value to be gained, on an academic and management level, from studies
within a single discipline. But no challenging modern environmental problem is strictly
within the realm of any one discipline, so none can be solved without some researchers
breaking the disciplinary mold.
Faculty too can be encouraged to break out of these silos. Perhaps the best incentive
for doing so is the realization that their colleagues in other disciplines can provide a
new perspective on problems they have seen as intractable, or can highlight the
importance of complications they had not understood. The first step might be informal
interaction-once faculty from disparate disciplines know and trust one another, they
can explore overlapping research interests 266 and begin to break through the jargon that
separates them. 267 The next might be institutional incentives to attempt the first
collaboration.
On the management side, the analogous need is for personnel willing and able to
transcend institutional boundaries. Resource conflicts almost by definition are not
readily confined either by political or by institutional limits. In order to pursue a big-
picture approach, not only to management itself but also to the information demands of
management, institutions must break free of their geographic, media-specific, and
mission-oriented boundaries. There are some hopeful signs in the recent creation of
264. See, e.g., Bammer, supra note 132, at 6.
265. A group at UC Davis funded by the National Science Foundation has had great success
exposing graduate students in ecology, population biology, history, economics, and other
disciplines to the multi-disciplinary perspectives required to get an intellectual grasp on the
problem of biological invasions. For a description of the program, see
http://www.cpb.ucdavis.edu/bioinv/.
266. See, e.g., Degnbol et al., supra note 69, at 542 ("Before cross-disciplinary interaction
works on an informal basis, we cannot assume that it will work on a formal basis. Colleagues
need to know each other well and respect each other before they can be expected to be creative
together and to take on shared responsibilities, for instance a joint research grant."). My own
experience suggests this statement may be a bit too strong, but it has more than a grain of truth.
Where a funding call demands multi-disciplinary participation, one researcher or disciplinary
group may take the initiative, and later call on another discipline to endorse what is already
almost a fully-fleshed out project. Quite often that serial disciplinary approach produces
resentment, but sometimes it may be an effective ice-breaker. It's unlikely to produce top-flight
cross-disciplinary research the first time out, but it may lead to the kinds of mutually respectful
interpersonal relationships, and the familiarity with one another's research interests, that are the
foundation of the best cross-disciplinary research.
267. See Katharine Jacobs, Gregg Garfin & Melanie Lenart, More Than Just Talk:
Connecting Science and Decisionmaking, 47(9) ENV'T, Nov. 2005, at 6, 13 ("Use ofjargon may
be one of the most significant limitations to applied interdisciplinary work and integrating
science with decision making.").
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novel eco-regional institutions, such as the Cal-Fed Bay-Delta program, the
Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan, and the Platte River Collaborative
Watershed Planning Process. 268 Clearly, though, much work remains to be done.
Although all of these programs cross political jurisdictions and bring together multiple
mission-oriented agencies, none of them is fully integrated across the environmental
spectrum. All concentrate on the distribution and quality of geographically discrete
water resources, focusing on a relatively small universe of big users or major pollution
sources. Furthermore, none has yet demonstrated staying power in the face of tough
budget climates. The Cal-Fed experience sounds a particularly cautionary note. The
Cal-Fed program in its original, cooperative federal-state form, is essentially dead.
Attempts are ongoing to revive it as a strictly state institution, but whether that will
work at all, and if so whether it will prove adequate to the scope of the challenges,
remains to be seen.
F. Archive Information in Accessible Places and Useable Forms
Too often, resource managers find themselves reinventing the wheel or unable to
evaluate the success of similar management actions because information that has been
gathered is not made available, or is not available in a standardized format. Given
modem information management and distribution tools, relatively small investments
ought to be able to make a big dent in that problem.
There are conspicuous examples of failures to take the seemingly simple step of
making information extracted for one purpose at one time by one source available for
others for subsequent use or reevaluation, 269 but there are also some successful
examples to draw on. One is FishBase 270 , a publicly accessible, free intemet database
compiling primarily biological but also some other information about nearly thirty
thousand fish species. 271 FishBase is heavily used, receiving about 20 million hits per
month from users worldwide. 272 Its usefulness to fisheries researchers is attested to by
the long and rapidly growing list of scientific papers that cite to it as a data source.
273
268. See Joseph L. Sax, The New Age of Environmental Restoration, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 1
(2001) (describing all three). Dan Farber and Jody Freeman propose the need for "modular"
institutions, characterized by flexible coordination between government agencies, and with
private entities. They describe the Cal-Fed program as an example of modularity. Freeman &
Farber, supra note 219 at 795.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 146-48.
270. http://www.fishbase.org.
271. Cornelia E. Nauen, Implementing the WSSD Decision of Restoring Marine Ecosystems
by 2015-Scientific Information Support in the Public Domain, 30 MARINE POL'Y 455, 457
(2006).
272. Id. at 456.
273. By early 2006, FishBase reportedly listed some 1125 publications citing it, with most of
those dated after it became available on the internet (instead of solely on CD) in 1999. Id. at
458. By July 2006, the number had grown only slightly, to 1169, suggesting perhaps that some
of those citations were for novelty alone. Not all of those citations appear in traditional papers.
Many are in web sites. Perhaps FishBase is most useful as a communication mechanism
available to share with wide audiences.
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FishBase also reaches out to take advantage of its user community's expertise,
allowing easy submission of comments, links, and suggestions. 
274
In order for scientific information to be usable by interested stakeholders as well as
by specialists, it must be expressed in accessible formats. Here, the fisheries world
provides another positive example. The Sea Around Us Project has a web site 275
intended to make information about fisheries status available to the public. It displays
graphically, and in eye-catching spatial displays, information that might otherwise lie
buried in obscure scientific publications.
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CONCLUSION
Management of natural resources subject to conflicting demands is a challenging
business for any number of reasons, but certainly the dearth of available information
about the consequences of management choices is one of the most important. We
should not underestimate the barriers to understanding the complex natural systems we
are now in the business of managing, falling prey to what has been described as "a
naively generous comprehension of how much ecologists and wildlife biologists know
of the natural world, and the ease and rapidity with which that knowledge can be
increased.''277 Expecting too much of scientists leads to the "sound science" movement
and unrealistic thresholds for changes to the status quo. That is hardly a recipe for
effective conservation.
But it is just as wrong-headed, and potentially just as harmful to the conservation
enterprise, to assume that data gaps are an irreducible natural phenomenon.
Considerable uncertainty will always remain, but there are opportunities to make better
use of existing information, to maximize extraction of information where feasible, and
to more effectively explore for new information sources.
Taking advantage of those opportunities will require committed leadership from
both sides of the research/management divide. That leadership must be attentive to
shortcomings on its own side of the ledger, sensitive to challenges on the other, and
dedicated to problem solving above personal advancement. Bridging the cultural gaps
that interfere with effective data supply is necessarily a long-term process that will
require adjusting training and professional expectations on both sides.
Reducing data gaps will also require commitment from political actors, who must
make funding available, construct new management institutions with the ability to see
and act across traditional boundaries, and establish a balance in those institutions
between the flexibility needed for experimentation and the oversight necessary to
demand evidence of learning. It will have to be an incremental process; the needed
changes are systemic and cannot happen overnight. One good place to start would be
with a broad overview of the types of exploratory research that might be of greatest
value to management, and how research funding might help promote that research.
Another is with the project of cataloging resource data as they are produced; making
them accessible to managers, researchers, and the public; and making them useful,
274. Id. at 459.
275. http://www.seaaroundus.org.
276. Nauen, supra note 272, at 459.
277. Shaffer et al., supra note 5, at 129.
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through format uniformity and database searchability, across the broadest possible
spectrum.
The first step toward a cure is always to admit that the patient has a problem. In the
case of natural resource management, that means getting beyond the misleading and
oppositional claims that, on the one hand, we need to act in the face of uncertainty and,
on the other, we need enough information to know what we're doing. Once we admit
that less-than-perfect information may be both useful and attainable, we can ask the
key questions: what information we have, whether we are making full use of it, what
additional information would be useful, and what it would take to obtain that added
information. Perhaps when we are able to take a close look we may find that, while not
full, the glass is less empty than either side has believed.

